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PREFACE
M27
c, ; Zoning law undoubtedly has entered into a period of transi-
tion. Although a municipality's zoning power was once thought
to be an entirely local matter, it is now considered to have
regional implications. Suburban land-use practices are currently
under attack by courts following a regional perspective of
zoning. In examining suburban zoning practices, some state
courts have rejected traditional legal approaches to zoning
and instead have adopted an approach based upon a fair share
allocation of regional housing needs. This regional approach
raises issues other than those normally associated with zoning
—
matters beyond the typical concern with the protection of private
property rights.
Since housing location in a metropolitan area influences to
a large degree the "quality of life" as well as the degree of
inequality, whether among individuals or municipalities, the
role of local land-use controls must be examined. The fair
share housing approach has offered guiding principles in how
local zoning ordinances should operate in providing areas for
housing all income groups. Traditionally zoning approaches have
rejected the fair share approach to housing usually on the basis
of a "protection of property rights" rationale. It is intended
that this thesis will show a relationship between the fair
share housing approach and planning principles.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Metropolitan development in the United States has been a
dynamic but uneven process that has created as many problems
as it has solved. The typical response to urban problems has
often lacked a perception of the interrelation of the various
communities within a metropolitan area. As a result, the
problems of inner-city decay and suburban development have
generally been treated as if they were two separate entities.
The metropolitan area as a whole has emerged as the unit of
analysis for many urban problems. The notion that certain
problems pertain exclusively to the central cities and other pro-
blems pertain to suburbs is being challenged by planners and
1
social scientists. There is growing awareness that issues of
inequality in the United States must be examined within a metro-
2politan context.
As metropolitan political fragmentation has increased on
the suburban periphery, the tendency toward spatial differen-
3tiation by socio-economic groups has also become greater.
Metropolitan spatial differentiation and political fragmenta-
tion can be viewed as interrelated issues having regional
implications in their effect upon urban stratification and
inequality. In a study by Richard C. Hill, governmental in-
equality defined in terms of municipal fiscal resources within
a metropolitan area was found to be related positively to the
size of the nonwhite population, the degree of income inequality,
-1-
2the income distribution, and the number of municipalities per
capita. The question of housing location within a metropolitan
area therefore becomes a principal factor in the allocation of
public goods and services. As Michael Danielson wrote:
The proliferation of suburban juris-
dictions, each with independent control
over access to residential, educational,
and recreational opportunities within its
borders, greatly reinforced the social,
economic, ethnic, and racial differences
among urban neighborhoods .
5
Suburban Exclusion
The power of developing, suburban municipalities to con-
trol the type of new housing construction primarily through
local zoning laws, in essence, determines who will occupy that
housing. Since income is a dominant factor in housing selec-
tion, local zoning laws enable a municipality to exclude low
and moderate-income groups by prohibiting the type of housing
within their economic means. Spatial differentiation by income
becomes incorporated within the fragmented metroplitan political
structure which maintain an unequal distribution of public goods
and services. Michael Burns wrote:
When the poor are excluded from certain
areas, or confined in others, a "separate-
but-equal" situation arises. As we have
learned from the civil rights movement,
separate never meant equal, at least at this
point in our history. As long as the poor,
less influential members of our society remain
confined in enclaves, city and county services
available in those areas will remain inferior
to the services provided in areas where the
citizenry is more politically effective.
6
Housing has remained a strictly local concern in the
politically autonomous suburbs. The local land-use policies
of the developing suburbs, which have largely excluded low and
moderate-income groups, have been able to thwart any movement
to recognize housing as a regional commodity. Rarely have
suburbs felt any responsibility for metropolitan problems which
have tended to concentrate in the central cities. Only the
problems of the suburban municipality are considered, although
the local decision-making of the suburbs may have considerable
impact on non-residents.
Residential location within a politically-fragmented
metropolitan area produces great differences in the level of
local services, local tax resources available to finance public
7
services, the need for services, and the local tax rate. The
disparity in the fiscal resources of the central cities compared
to those of the politically-independent suburbs may be attributed
in part to suburban zoning laws that have promoted the single-
family residence to the exclusion of other types of housing and
also industrial and commercial development to bolster the local
tax base. As a consequence, the cost of providing for the
concentration of urban poor is placed on the central cities
which have experienced a declining tax base due to decentraliza-
tion of commerce and industry and the flight of the affluent to
the suburbs. The suburbs tend to seek only relatively high-
income residences, which generally produce a lower demand for
services, and also high tax-yielding, non-residential property.
Central-city residents usually pay proportionately higher
taxes for the equivalent levels of services in the suburbs,
despite the likelihood that the need for such services may be
8
much greater in the central cities. On the other hand,
suburbanites can have, proportionate to income, either the
luxury of a higher level of services at a low tax cost or a very
9
small tax cost for an only average level of services. Central
cities also have more competing services to provide for unlike
the suburbs that can either avoid many services through exclu-
sionary zoning or utilize services already provided in the
central cities.
Decentralizing businesses are even able to shop around for
the best tax rate among the suburbs competing for non-residential
property to augment their tax base. Extreme cases of economic
segregation arise from such suburban development. For example,
the zoning ordinances of 20 central New Jersey suburbs provided
for the housing of 144,000 families yet included enough land for
industry and research to create approximately 1.2 million jobs. °
This common suburban practice of isolating the residence of the
worker from the place of employment typifies the metropolitan
inequality perpetuated in part by local zoning laws.
The Regional Housing Approach
The concept of the fair-share housing allocation plan
constitutes a means of meeting housing needs on a regional
basis. Such a plan mandates that each suburban municipality
within a metropolitan area must provide its regional fair share
of low and moderate-income housing. The spatial distribution
of economic groups becomes a salient factor in the regional
housing allocation plan, an approach developed largely by a
few state courts. These few state courts have invalidated local
5zoning ordinances on the ground that municipalities were failing
to meet their regional, fair share of low and moderate-income
housing. The New Jersey courts have gone a step further by
granting affirmative relief, i.e. actually requiring developing
municipalities to provide for regional housing needs on the
basis of a regional housing plan. The state courts, most
notably in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, have developed a metro-
politan approach to housing needs in response to the suburban
municipalities, which have conducted zoning as a strictly local
concern and often neglected regional considerations.
Regional housing plans, mandated by the state courts, may
be the only realistic way to ensure that municipalities at least
provide land zoned for low and moderate-income housing. This
judicial remedy has been severely criticized as an usurpation
of the legislative function of zoning and a violation of the
separation of powers doctrine. Attempts at metropolitan
housing programs by both the legislative and executive branches
of the federal government have generated intense political furor
and consequently have been discontinued.
The Secretary of HUD, George Romney, experienced the quin-
tessence of suburban politics in 1969 when he tried unsuccessfully
to force Warren, Michigan to accept subsidized, low-income
housing. The increasing number of suburban congressmen have
been able to prevent any legislation requiring a metropolitan
12housing approach, as a bill in 1972 did, or a "forced
integration" approach which would have drastically limited
local autonomy in zoning. Instead, Congress has been differential
6to local control of zoning and even strengthened local automony
in 1972 by granting communities the power to approve Section 235
13
and 236 subsidized housing. The Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974, despite one of its lofty goals of
"spatial deconcentration of housing opportunities for persons
14
of lower income," also rejected a metropolitan approach to
housing. Because of the extreme hostility towards metropolitan
housing approaches, the judiciary (most likely the state courts)
has been forced to address this problem of exclusion due to the
failure of the other branches of government and may offer the
only possible resolution of this issue. Norman Williams noted:
...it has been recognized that it is an
essential part of the judicial function to
watch over the parochial and exclusionist
attitudes and policies of local governments,
and to see to it that these do not run counter
to national policy or the general welfare. 16
THE SUBURBAN SOCIETY
The United States can no longer be viewed as an urban nation
but rather as a suburban nation. The suburb typically exists
as an independent political unit, jurisdictionally separate from
the central-city government, but yet a part of the larger metro-
politan area. The predominant form of metropolitan growth has
clearly been the suburb— a trend that is expected to continue
given the shortage and the high cost of available land in the
central city. More people now reside in the suburbs than in
the central cities and nonmetropolitan areas. Suburbanization
certainly is not a recent phenomena, although the pace has
accelerated subsequent to WWII and the concomitant effects have
7become more pronounced in relationship to the core cities.
The suburbs have been the most dynamic area in the nation
from a standpoint of economic and population growth. Not only
have the central cities yielded their former population dominance
of the metropolitan areas to the suburbs, but they have also
experienced massive declines in industrial and commercial
employment, which also were suburbanized.
In 1977 the suburbs accounted for 57.9% of the metropolitan
population, whereas the central cities were 42.1%. From 1970
to 1977, the population of the central cities declined by 4.0%,
1
8
and the suburban population increased by 11.7%. Over a
period of the twenty years, the central cities changed from
56.8% of the metropolitan population in 1950 to 50.1% in 1960
19to 46.1% in 19 70. This marked decline would have been even
more striking if not for the suburban annexation by many of the
core cities. On the other hand, the suburbs steadily grew from
43.2% of the metropolitan population in 1950 to 49.9% in 1960 to
2053.9% in 1970. This suburban population growth has been pro-
jected to be 65 to 70% of the metropolitan population and 44 to
21
46.5% of the total U.S. population by 2000.
Suburban employment has also accounted for the largest
portion of metropolitan employment growth. An estimated 80%
22
of all new jobs are being created in the suburbs.*" From 1960
to 1970, commercial and industrial decentralization resulted in
an employment decline of 6.9% in the central cities of the 15
largest metropolitan areas compared to a 43.6% employment
2 3increase in the suburbs of these metropolitan areas. J Although
8employment in the central cities has increased in government,
service, or administrative functions, the suburban economic
growth is indicative of the demise of the commercial and indus-
trial functions of the core cities.
A Summary Discussion of the Socio-economic Characteristics of
City and Suburb
The image of suburbia as an affluent, socially and racially
homogenous development is an unfounded stereotype. There are
black suburbs, ethnic suburbs, working-class suburbs, and even
suburbs with significant amounts of poverty. Nevertheless, the
trend is definitely toward a relatively affluent, white popula-
tion in the developing suburbs. Aggregate census data tend to
understate the degree of suburban exclusion.
Although blacks are increasingly moving to the suburbs, the
black, suburban population constituted about 4.6% of the total
24
suburban population in 1970 and 5.6% in 1977. There was a
26.4% increase in the number of suburban blacks from 1960-1970
25
and 34.5% increase from 1970-1977. However, in light of the
black population in the central cities, the number of blacks
residing in the suburbs was minuscule. In 1977, almost 75% of
all metropolitan blacks resided in the central cities while
approximately 37% of all metropolitan whites were central-city
26
residents. From 1960-1970, the number of central-city blacks
27
increased by 32.3% and from 1970-1977 by 6.5%. Obviously, the
suburban, black population has been growing much more rapidly
than the central-city, black population.
9From 1960-1970 the white, central-city population remained
nearly constant compared to a 2 6.1% increase in the suburban,
2 8
white population for the same period. The white, central-city
29
population declined by 8.2% from 1970-1977. In 1977, 63.1% of
all metropolitan whites lived in the suburbs whereas only 25.2%
30
of all metropolitan blacks lived outside of the central cities.
There was a 9.8% increase from 1970-1977 for the suburban white
31
population. Despite increasing black suburbanization, racial
polarization between the central cities and suburbs persists.
The current trend for metropolitan whites definitely reveals a
pattern of white flight from the central cities. Many cities,
in particular the older, eastern cities, are already over 50%
black, and several others are approaching this figure.
Although the suburbs do contain substantial numbers of the
poor, the distribution of metropolitan poverty is concentrated
in the central cities. In 1977, 15.8% of all central-city
residents were below the poverty level while only 6.9% of all
32
suburban residents were within that category. Of the total
metropolitan poverty, 62.3% of all persons below the poverty
. . 33level in 1976 were located within the central cities.
The 1976 median income for families living in central
cities with a population of one million or more was $13,700
compared to $18,419 in the suburbs. For all metropolitan
areas, the 1976 median income in central cities was $13,952
35
and $17,440 in the suburbs. Slightly more than 60% of all
suburban families earned $15,000 or more in 1976. ° In the
central cities, approximately 45% of the population had incomes
37
of $15,000 or more.
18.,4%
24.,0%
28..1%
26..6%
24..3%
30.,6%
39..1%
50..8%
53..1%
59.,1%
59..4%
61..9%
66..3%
71..4%
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A TABLE OF THE
Percentage of Metropolitan Families
in the Suburbs by Race and Income
Income Black Families White Families
Under $5,000
$5,000 to $6,999
$7,000 to $8,999
$9,000 to $11,999
$12,000 to $14,999
$15,000 to $24,999
$25,000 and over
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Consumer Income: Money
Income in 1976 of Families and Persons in the United States
63-65 (Series P-60, No. 114, 1978).
The influence of both race and income revealed an even
more exclusionary pattern of development in the suburbs. As in
the case of white families, black families with relatively high
incomes were more likely to reside in the suburbs, even though
the effect of income upon black suburbanization was much less
than upon white suburbanization. The percentage of white
families earning $25,000 or more living in the suburbs was
approximately 1.8 times greater than the percentage of black
families at that same income level and also living in the
suburbs. Black families earning $25,000 or more were the
most likely to reside in the suburbs, and then this figure was
39
only 39.1%. White families at all income levels were more
40
than 50% suburban. Only 18.4% of all metropolitan black
families earning under $5,000 lived in the suburbs. A total
of 50.8% of all metropolitan white families at that income
level lived in suburbs, although this income group had the
42
lowest percentage of white families living in the suburbs.
The 1976 median income for metropolitan blacks was $9,984
43
compared to $16,767 for metropolitan whites. Of all
11
metropolitan blacks, 28.6% were below the poverty level; this
was more than three times the rate for metropolitan whites.
Regardless of the lower rate of poverty (7.9%), metropolitan
whites still constituted 63.5% of all metropolitan poverty.
*
There were more poor whites than poor blacks in the suburbs as
well as the central cities. However, black poverty was heavily
concentrated in the central cities, which contained 81% of all
46
metropolitan black poverty. White poverty in the central
47
cities amounted to 52% of all metropolitan white poverty.
The trend in metroplitan population movement is the
suburbanization of both wealthy blacks and whites. In addition
to this income-selective characteristic of suburbanization, race
still remains an important but somewhat diminishing factor.
Income differences between cities and suburbs are considerable,
especially in the larger metropolitan areas. The demographic
pattern revealed from suburban population characteristics tends
to support the perception of suburban development as discrimina-
tory on both racial and economic grounds
.
Housing in the Suburbs
From 1960 to 1970, 65% of all new housing stock in metro-
politan areas was being constructed in the suburbs. The
single-family residence accounted for 66% of the new housing
49in suburbia and 72% of the total suburban housing stock.
The 1970 to 1976 construction figures revealed a decline in
the trend—the single family residence was 56.2% of all new
50suburban dwelling units. The increase in multi-family housing
12
was due, in part, to the high cost of single family homes.
The single-family home as the predominant type of housing
in suburbia has had tremendous socio-economic implications
simply because of the rapid inflation in the cost of housing
construction. The average sales price of a new, single-family
house in 1970 was $26,300 compared to the average sales price
of $44,200 in 1976. Almost 47% of American families could
52
afford a new house in 1970. In 1976 only 27% of families had
53
sufficient income to purchase a new home. The average sales
price of new single-family homes for the second quarter of 1978
was $61, 500. 54
If the generally accepted rule that a house must be no
greater than 2 to 2.50 times family income was applied, then
the minimum income necessary to purchase a new house in 197 8
was approximately $24,000 to $30,000. Approximately 80% of the
American population did not have any choice but to seek housing
other than the new single-family residence. To provide low and
moderate-income housing necessarily means that apartments, other
multi-family developments, subsidized housing, and mobile homes
will house much of the population.
LAND-USE CONTROLS IN SUBURBIA
Metropolitan residential patterns are spatially differ-
entiated by socio-economic status. Access to suburban
communities where new housing and employment opportunities are
the greatest is severely restricted to the low-income population,
minority groups, and to a lesser extent even moderate-income
groups:
13
Residents of the suburban communities
are now almost exclusively white and
affluent— a product of land availability
and speculation, of federal policies toward
subsidized housing and the interstate highway
system, of population growth and dispersion
patterns, of the practices of real estate,
banking, and home building industries. All
the prevailing forces have tended to keep
out low-income families, regardless of race
or origin. 55
Land-use controls are a potent instrument in the hands of
suburban municipalities. When these land-use controls are
used to limit the availability of low and moderate-income
housing, the suburban municipalities are, in effect, control-
ing whom will reside in their communities. Although suburban
racial exclusion is also a recognized problem, the most effec-
tive means of excluding both the poor and the black has been
primarily local zoning laws which have tended to promote low-
density, single-family residential developments—most
importantly, relatively expensive housing.
In terms of the absolute number of people potentially
affected by suburban land-use decisions, low-income, central-
city whites are the largest group affected. In terms of
proportionate impact, however, low-income, central-city blacks
are more adversely affected simply because they constitute a
larger proportion of the central-city black population than do
low-income whites of the central-city white population. The
local land-use policies of suburban municipalities are affect-
ing a large number of the metropolitan, low and moderate-income
population, who have had no representation in this regional
matter and consequently are largely confined to the central
14
cities. As Michael Danielson noted:
Land is the most valuable resource
in the suburbs. Its control by local ,- 6government is the key to surburban exclusion.
Suburban municipalities have at their disposal a panoply
of zoning laws, subdivision regulations, and building codes
—
all police power functions intended to promote the health,
safety, and general welfare. Even when the intent of local
land-use controls constitutes a legitimate exercise of the
police power, the effect of these land-use controls may be to
keep the cost of housing unnecessarily high or to prohibit or
severely restrict various housing types. Exclusionary zoning
practices have become much more complex and inventive since the
195 0' s and 1960's when the minimum lot size and minimum floor
area were heavily relied upon techniques. Consequently, it is
generally difficult to point at one single law or regulation as
exclusionary when the total effect of a municipality's land-use
controls is economically discriminatory.
Zoning laws which serve to increase the cost of housing
may entail a minimum lot size, a minimum floor area, or a
maximum residential density. If apartments or other multi-
family dwellings are permitted, often a very minimal area is
zoned for multi-family use—a practice which forces the price
of land to increase due to the restricted supply and ultimately
raises the cost of housing. Minimum parking requirements, design
standards, and building codes also can be utilized to increase
the rental price of apartments. Subdivision regulations may
15
require mandatory dedications of land or buildings, or other
expensive specifications which are all costs eventually passed
on to the consumer. Regardless of a municipality's intent,
land-use controls may involve both rather simple and sophisti-
cated techniques which tend to increase the cost of housing and
thus exclude a significant portion of the population.
Total prohibition of apartments, other multi-family types,
and mobile homes is quite common in many suburbs. Multi-family
dwellings, when they are permitted, may be restricted to largely
efficiency and one-bedroom units in order to exclude families
with children. Municipalities also have the power to veto in
many federally-subsidized housing programs. To avoid the appear-
ance of a total prohibition in low and moderate-income housing,
areas may be zoned for such use but zoning policies and procedures
may place so severe restrictions that the effect is tantamount
to total exclusion. When low and moderate-income housing types
are permitted, these designated areas are often quite minimal
compared to the area of the detached, single-family districts.
There may be overzoning for industrial use in order to prevent
low and moderate-income housing. Even low-income, elderly
housing may be used to circumvent requirements for the inclusion
of low-income housing within a municipality. The timing of
capital improvements, such as roads, sewers, and water lines,
can also be utilized to exclude low and moderate-income groups.
Increasingly, delays in administrative and procedural decision-
making are being employed to place financial burdens on low and
moderate-income housing developers.
16
Rarely do zoning ordinances express an intent to exclude,
even though the effect of exclusion may be quite explicit. Many
state and federal court cases have set precedents for broad
interpretations of the legitimate purposes of zoning as they
relate to the health, safety, and general welfare of the
public.
The most common justification of exclusionary zoning is
the maintenance of the fiscal integrity of the community. Low
and moderate-income housing developments are viewed as bad
ratables, which tend to require more municipal services and to
produce more children, possibly placing a burden on local
schools. Higher property taxes are thought to result when low
and moderate-income housing is allowed within the community.
The reliance upon the local property tax for municipal revenues
creates a tendency of permitting only good ratables, or single-
family residences, commercial and industrial development, which
all most probably will generate more tax revenues than municipal
services required. As Norman Williams wrote:
...the system provides a subsidy for
antisocial conduct, particularly by the
more prosperous communities. '
Protection of property values is another defense used to
justify exclusion of low and moderate-income housing. A similar
justification is the preservation of the "character" of an area.
Even the protection of the environment is used to exclude low
and moderate-income housing. Whether the maintenance of fiscal
integrity, the protection of property values, the preservation
of the community character and environment, or other similar
justifications are legitimate purposes of zoning remain unsettled
17
issues in both the state and federal courts. There are numerous
court decisions that both tend to approve as well as invalidate
these local justifications of zoning. However, the state courts,
which have adopted a regional approach to housing, have rejected
many of these typical defenses of suburban zoning.
Exclusion and Ideology
Economic discrimination is generally a way of life for the
suburban municipalities utilizing land-use controls for purposes
of social control in respect to which socio-economic groups will
reside within their community. Because housing selection
obviously involves distinctions of social class and status,
exclusion of the low and moderate-income population transcends
the property tax justification of local zoning practices. Many
suburbanites view central-city dwellers, especially the poor, as
5 8
an affront to their relatively affluent socio-economic status.
Low-income people are often perceived as largely "undesirables,"
who could threaten the livability of any community where they
reside. Furthermore, poor people are often held to be individually
responsible for their economic condition and tend to be feared
by suburbanites.
Any low and moderate-income housing in the suburbs is
thought to be the harbinger of crime and other social disorders.
Therefore, the vehement opposition to low-cost housing in the
suburbs is as much a response to isolate social disorder in the
central cities as it is to exclude the low-income population
from the suburbs. A major function of local government, as
18
perceived by suburbanites, is the exclusion of undesirables
59from their community. The trend in suburbia is to resist
change and to preserve the status quo; exclusionary zoning
represents one of the best methods of attaining these ends.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
Judicial decisions on land-use regulation and fair share
allocation are limited to fairly well-defined geographic areas
in the United States. The "key" decisions have occurred in the
more densely populated states experiencing rapid suburban
development and are basically confined to California, New
Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. Federal court decisions,
although they conform to districts or circuits, have also
tended to occur within the same geographic areas or in the
larger metropolitan areas of the United States.
State and federal court decisions have often taken conflict-
ing approaches in exclusionary zoning litigation. The state
courts that have followed a metropolitan approach to housing
have defined exclusionary zoning as a question of economic
discrimination. The federal courts which have refused to
recognize economic discrimination as unconstitutional or in-
valid, have been limited entirely to the question of racial
discrimination. In contrast to the state courts adopting a
regional housing approach, the federal courts have tended to
show deference for local land-use decisions and to hear cases
involving specific-site projects. Not only have the state
court decisions invalidated zoning in specific-site cases but
19
also in general practice suits based on the rights of future
residents. Since the federal courts have limited cases to
questions of racial discrimination in specific housing projects,
the effect has been to shift the forum in regional housing
allocation disputes to the state courts where a broader,
regional perspective of zoning has been applied.
The scope of this thesis will extend to the "key" decisions,
both state and federal, that deal with regulatory questions of
regional housing allocation. The scope will not necessarily
be limited to the fair share approach since other court decisions
may provide models or insights into the problem under investiga-
tion. Only appellate decisions will be utilized in the analysis
of zoning models.
The methodologies utilized in this thesis will be case
study, content analysis, and case comparison. Judicial decisions
will be analyzed for content and maining and will then be com-
pared with similar cases for contrast. The court cases will
also be examined to determine if any planning concepts in land-
use regulation may be derived. Reviews, comments, and critiques
of these cases appearing in secondary works and scholarly
periodicals will be used to supplement the author's analysis
and interpretations.
The rationale for the methodologies to be employed can be
justified on the following premises:
a. The case study approach can trace the historical
development of relevant court decisions and
relate them to land-use practices.
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b. The time frame involved and institutional
constraints make participant-observer
methods impractical within the legal
framework.
c. Empirical case comparison is not feasible
because of the divergent decisions of the
state and federal courts.
d. Content analysis can extract both general
principles and exact meanings.
e. The use of secondary data and multiple cases
allow for a broad comparison of many differ-
ent decisions so that a more effective model
can be constructed.
Data extracted from the case study, case comparison, and
content analysis will be used to develop models or "policy
principles" for guides in formulating fair share allocation
plans. To establish empirical confirmation of these models,
the model [s] may either be used to test or measure the effec-
tiveness of a fair share housing allocation plan or be used
inductively to construct such a plan. The methodological
process, then, will move from research to product in three
distinct steps:
1. Construction of a model of zoning as it
presently functions in the metropolitan
or regional areas of the United States.
2. Construction of a model of zoning to
include the fair share allocation approach
provided by various state court decisions.
3. Construction of a comparative model of
zoning which incorporates regional
responsibility for metropolitan housing
needs and also explores future implications
of the fair share plan.
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Chapter 2
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ZONING AND OVERVIEW
The physical development of the city unfolded as a field of
inquiry for urban reformers in the late 19th century. As the
problems of health, sanitation, congestion, pollution, and
physical blight were recognized as pressing community issues,
efforts to regulate the exercise of private property rights were
made in response to these externalities of the laissez faire land
market. These consequences of urban development were perceived
largely as physical problems, requiring physical solutions.
Regulation restricting the exercise of private property rights
was proposed as the most appropriate method of controlling the
physical development of the city.
Zoning regulations were developed at a time when the concept
of land ownership was highly individualistic. Land was viewed
essentially as a commodity to be exploited for personal gain.
Prior to zoning, the only public restraint upon the use of land
was nuisance law, which controlled those activities resulting in
an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of
another owner's property. The inadquacy of nuisance law became
apparent when the problems of urban development were acknowledged
as being more than just the elimination of offensive land uses.
Private land-use controls were utilized by various property
owners to exclude certain uses, generally in residential areas.
-24-
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These private land-use arrangements were usually in the form of
restrictive covenants prohibiting activities which, while un-
desirable to property owners in a certain area, did not con-
stitute public nuisances. Although restrictive covenants in
residential subdivisions were effective in controlling land
use, these private controls covered only a part of the city.
Nuisance law and private land-use controls were limited in
their applicability to the city as a whole. The effect was
largely uncontrolled urban development in the absence of private
restrictive covenants or a finding that a particular activity
was nuisance. In context of the inadaquacies of these two pre-
zoning land-use control devices, the need arose for a comprehen-
sive land-use scheme covering the entire urban area and range
of land uses.
The Rise of Public Land-Use Controls
The initial attempts at public land-use regulation in urban
areas were piecemeal and often utilized to control only those
uses deemed to be public nuisances such as stables, taverns, or
dance halls. Several cities also adopted ordinances regulating
building height and bulk and minimum construction standards.
The U.S. Supreme Court approved these piecemeal land-use regula-
tions in several cases that held the exclusion of certain land
uses relating to the public health and safety was within the
scope of the police power. These decisions and numerous other
state court decisions marked the expanding role of local govern-
ment regulation in land use.
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There were no comprehensive zoning ordinances encompassing
the total physical development of a city until the state of New
York adopted the first zoning enabling legislation, which granted
the power to zone to municipalities. In 1916 New York City
became the first municipality to pass a comprehensive zoning
ordinance. With most of the states following the example of
New York, zoning had become a common practice in nearly all the
2
cities of the nation by the 1920' s.
Theoretically, zoning was intended to be a positive tool to
shape orderly growth rather than just a response to undesirable
activities. The introduction of zoning marked a changing concept
of land ownership in which the right to develop land was no
longer considered absolute. Instead, there was a balancing of
private property rights against the public interest or general
welfare. Nevertheless, protection of private property rights
was the essence of zoning. John Delafons wrote concerning the
origin of zoning law:
...it was a means of strengthening the
institution of private property in the face
of rapid and unsettling changes in the urban
scene that zoning won such remarkable
acceptance in American communities.
3
Zoning attempted to establish a hierarchy of land uses, to
separate incompatible land uses, and to provide standards for
various uses within their respective districts. As originally
conceived, zoning constituted not only a means of segregating
divergent land uses but also an inclusionary device allowing
for all types of land-use activities within a municipality.
However, the practice of total exclusion of many uses within a
municipality developed into the commonplace despite this
27
inclusionary nature of zoning. Land uses such as junkyards,
dumps, drive-in theatres, motels, and mobile home parks were
often excluded entirely from municipalities. Housing types
other than the single-family residence were also lumped to-
gether with this group of totally prohibited uses. Many of
the courts were quite willing to accept the concept that a
municipality was under no duty to provide for every kind of
5
use within its boundaries.
The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, the pattern for most
of the states' zoning enabling legislation, detailed the
purposes of zoning:
Such regulations shall be made in accord-
ance with a comprehensive plan and designed to
lessen congestion in the streets; to secure
safety from fire, panic, and other dangers;
to promote health and the general welfare; to
provide adequate light and air; to prevent the
overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concen-
tration of population; to facilitate the
adequate provision of transportation, water,
sewerage, schools, parks, and other public
requirements. Such regulations shall be made
with reasonable consideration among other
things, to the character of the district and
its peculiar suitability for particular uses,
and with a view to conserving the value of
buildings and encouraging the most appropriate
use of land throughout such a municipality .
6
Zoning was able to provide a sense of stability and order in
urban land-use allocation on the municipality level. With the
advent of zoning, competition among land developers on the local
level was reduced from the chaotic pre-zoning period where un-
regulated land-use decisions were only subject to nuisance law and
private controls. However, these local land-use controls
shifted the land-use competition to the inter-community level
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in which local land-use decision-making had the potential to
affect the metropolitan region as a whole. New communities
within a metropolitan region were competing with each other
for desirable land uses and good ratables. The power to zone
was delegated by the states to the local governmental units
which were thought to be the most suited for controlling urban
growth. Robert Anderson noted:
Zoning severely restricted landowners
but left individual units of government
relatively free to employ the zoning power
in the provincial interest of the zoning
municipalities. Each unit of local govern-
ment, large or small, was empowered to
restrict the use of land within its borders
to achieve objectives which were within the
reach of the police power, with little or
no regard for the needs of the broader
community.
'
Judicial Approval of Zoning
In 1926 zoning was given constitutional approval in
g
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co . A local zoning ordinance
had been challenged as a taking of private property without
compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court upheld the zoning
ordinance as a proper exercise of the police power and also
established a presumption of legislative validity in zoning
law. The burden to demonstrate an ordinance to be invalid was
therefore placed on the challenger rather than the municipality.
The result of this decision was that a zoning ordinance was to
be presumed valid even if the validity of the ordinance was
debatable. This presumption of validity made it very difficult
29
to challenge any zoning enactment. For a zoning ordinance to
be struck down, it would have to be an "arbitrary and
capricious" exercise of the police power having no substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
9
welfare. In Nectow v. City of Cambridge , the Supreme Court
established the principal that while zoning per se was not
unconstitutional, zoning as applied to a particular piece of
property could be unconstitutional. The Court in the Euclid
decision did provide for an exception to the municipality's
power to zone:
It is not meant by this, however, to
exclude the possibility of cases where the
general public interest would so far outweigh
the interest of the municipality that the
municipality would not be allowed to stand
in the way. 3-0
The Present Trend in Zoning
Although zoning predated city planning as a municipal function,
it has remained or at least has maintained the potential to be
a principal implementation tool of comprehensive planning. In
theory, the comprehensive plan represented the formulation of
a municipality's physical development goals and was to be the
basis of local land-use decisions. All too often in practice,
however, zoning, particularly in the suburbs, has constituted
the antithesis of comprehensive planning. Many of the
suburbs have rejected the concept of inclusionary zoning as a
positive, development-shaping force in land-use allocation.
Rather than provide a regulatory pattern for future development,
zoning has emerged as a legal institution utilized to prevent
development.
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The relationship between zoning and comprehensive planning has
often been non-existent or quite minimal at best. Planning has
often been utilized as a public relations device for local
political figures or else as a defense of land-use decisions as
12
opposed to a rational basis for these decisions. Planning
certainly has not been a neutral instrument in which technical
experts purportedly would make the land-use decisions according
to some rational criteria. If a municipality had a comprehen-
sive plan and could demonstrate that its land-use decisions were
"in accordance with the comprehensive plan," then generally a
court challenge to the local decision would be unsuccessful.
Robert Nelson concluded:
. . .Many new comprehensive plans are
predestined to fail, because their most
essential practical purpose is not to provide
the policy principles for community land-use
controls but to camouflage these principles.
Overly explicit descriptions of community
land-use policies might endanger the planning
link in the legal reasoning that sustains
the policies, and in some instances it might
also be considerably at odds with the
community self-image. 13
Zoning has enjoyed limited success in that it did produce
general improvements in living conditions such as the segrega-
tion of incompatible land uses, the lessening of congestion and
transportation problems, and the more efficient location of
14
public facilities. What the proponents of the first zoning
ordinances did not anticipate was the fragmentation of local
governments within a metropolitan area, the increasing inter-
relatedness of the municipalities composing a metropolitan area,
and the ways in which a municipality could pervert the original
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purposes of zoning to serve exclusionary purposes. There was a
conflict between the legal theory of zoning and the political
system in which it was to exist:
The theory upon which the imposition
of zoning restrictions is based varies to
a remarkable degree from the real world in
which zoning operates. Theory is divergent
from practice in that it collides with the
procedures followed by zoning authorities , 5
and the uses to which zoning laws are put.
EXCLUSION: THE AMERICAN WAY
Exclusion of various socio-economic groups from discreet
geographical areas certainly has not been a contemporary
phenomenon but rather is deeply ingrained in American urban
history. Even at the time zoning was first proposed in New
York City, this discriminatory history was reflected. Despite
the urban reformers' concern for the poor physical conditions,
what perhaps really prompted the first comprehensive zoning
ordinance was the Fifth Avenue merchants' fears that the
immigrants employed in the garment factories would encroach
16
upon their business district. Moreover, the trial court
which had invalidated the Euclid zoning ordinance was well
aware of the exclusionary potential of zoning and labeled it
17
a form of economic segregation. Anderson wrote:
The use of governmental power to
protect private interests by preserving
the status quo, at the expense of prevent-
ing the solution of problems which involve
the public welfare, was not invented in the
1960's. Before zoning began, local residents
employed the powers of government to exclude
outsiders and preserve local amenities. 18
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Blatant statutory discrimination against racial minorities,
either expressly stated in a statute or carried out in the
administration of a seemingly fair law, has been subject to
constitutional attack under the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. For example, in San Francisco during the
late 1800' s, a city ordinance requlating laundries was utilized
to discriminate expressly against Chinese and thus was held
unconstitutional since white owners of laundries had been
19
exempted from this ordinance. Although the Court recognized
that the regulation of this land use was a legitimate police
power function, the discriminatory administration of a racially-
neutral law was nevertheless in violation of the equal protection
clause.
Had the city enforced the ordinance in a non-discriminatory
manner, the effect would still have been to exclude Chinese who
at that time owned most of the laundries in San Francisco.
Therefore, a city by prohibiting or restricting a particular
land use through the exercise of the police power could limit
the access of a particular racial group, so long as the ordinance
20
was applied equally. The non-discriminatory administration of
an ordinance restricting the land use that a racial minority was
most likely to occupy would not be subject to constitutional
challenge. This was an indirect but just as effective exclusion-
ary device.
A zoning ordinance that established separate residential
districts for blacks and whites was also found to be unconsti-
21
tutional. Enforcement of racially restrictive covenants
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was likewise held unconstitutional. As these cases demon-
strated in land-use regulation, any law or state action that
expressly discriminated against a racial minority would not
withstand a constitutional challenge.
Discrimination in explicit terms was abandoned by suburban
governments in favor of an indirect but equally as effective
method. Rather than restrict in less than subtle terms the
access of a particular socio-economic group and thus show a
discriminatory intent, a municipality could prohibit or restrict
particular land uses such as low and moderate-income housing.
This was a more sophisticated strategy which could nevertheless
have the same end result as the more blatant forms of discrimi-
nation. By focusing upon the type of land use which may be
suitable for certain socio-economic groups and thereby cloaking
the exclusionary zoning ordinance with a police power rationale,
denial of the intent to exclude "undesirables" could be made even
though the ultimate effect was quite obvious. One urban planner
observed:
The words incompatible and undesirable
,
so frequently heard among zoning advocates,
must be candidly recognized as referring
primarily to people and social class and
racial groupings and only secondarily to
structures and uses. 23
Municipalities have an abundance of reasons at their disposal
to justify most zoning ordinances as a legitimate exercise of
the police power. Any police power rationale would generally
suffice to ward off a legal challenge since the state courts
have been quite willing to interpret the municipality's power
to zone very broadly. The precedent value of the presumption
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of validity in the Euclid decision became an invaluable shield
for zoning ordinances. If some police power argument could be
made in support of a zoning ordinance, then the excluded group
would probably be unsuccessful in challenging the ordinance due
to the presumption of validity unless a "suspect class," e.g.,
race or a " fundamental right" was involved. Because the real
purpose behind a zoning law might be nearly impossible to deter-
mine and also the relative ease in providing a police power
rationale, some courts have been reluctant to invalidate zoning
which has an exclusionary impact on a particular socio-economic
group
.
Zoning to Meet Local Desires
Zoning must be recognized as an intensely political process
reflecting the political power discrepancies among the various
socio-economic groups of a metropolitan region. In this setting
the widespread suburban practice of exclusionary zoning should
not be viewed as some aberrant form of behavior. Undoubtedly,
suburban land-use practices have fulfilled local desires. While
zoning theory may suggest otherwise, zoning has not been a non-
political, neutral device in which the technical decisions of
land-use allocation were made by the professional planners:
American land-use controls, in effect,
were designed to promote private property
interests which may have little to do with
what planners would regard as a desirable
pattern of land use. 2 4
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A LOCAL MODEL OF ZONING
A local model of zoning has been the predominant viewpoint
of municipal land-use regulation in most of the state courts as
well as the United States Supreme Court. The justifications of
exclusionary zoning practices have generally been upheld when
examined from a local perspective. This may be due, in part,
to reliance upon outdated zoning precedents and legal principles
in an urban environment vastly changed from the one in which
zoning was formulated. Consequently, the majority of courts
adhering to a local model of zoning has exhibited a deferential
attitude toward suburban zoning practices.
Minimum lot sizes, minimum floor areas, prohibition of
multi-family housing and mobile homes, bedroom restrictions
in multi-family housing, unnecessarily expensive PUD and
subdivision requirements, and many other exclusionary land-use
techniques that have an adverse effect upon lower-income housing
opportunities have been upheld in various state and federal
courts. With the federal courts and almost all the state courts
adhering to the Euclid decision, suburban zoning has been subject
to a presumption of validity and would only be invalidated if no
rational relationship to a governmental interest could be
demonstrated. Under this test, very few zoning ordinances have
not been able to pass.
A local model of zoning has not been able to account for
the interests of the low and moderate-income population of the
metropolitan area. Suburban zoning practices when challenged
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as a form of economic discrimination have been regarded in the
same manner as any other municipal ordinance. A suburban
municipality would be able to offer several zoning objectives
that would meet the requirements of a rational relationship
test applied by the courts maintaining a local perspective of
zoning. Zoning would be permissible to protect property values,
the residential character, the environment, the rural character,
neighborhood stability and quality, and the community appear-
ance; a municipality could also zone to avoid financial burdens,
to strengthen the tax base, to promote good ratables, and to
provide adequate municipal services as well as municipal
revenues. From a local perspective of zoning, these objectives
would not be scrutinized in relation to the regional impact on
housing.
A local model of zoning would consider only the interests
of the municipality in its land-use practices. Any challenge
to a zoning ordinance would generally be limited to property
owners. Most of the courts have followed the Nectow decision
which allowed a property owner to challenge the validity of a
zoning ordinance only as it applied to a particular piece of
property and upon assertion of some resultant injury. As a
basic principle, the Supreme Court and most of the state courts
have disallowed legal challenges based on injury to the commun-
, „
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ity or region in general without any property interest involved.
The rights of low and moderate-income individuals have sometimes
been permitted to be asserted in conjunction with the rights of
the property owner, especially in cases of racial discrimina-
tion. 6 However, the courts adhering to a local perspective
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have usually failed to address the issue of the rights of low
and moderate-income persons to housing opportunity or, at best,
tangentially addressed the rights of this group. A local model
of zoning simply has not provided the framework for analyzing
the effect of a zoning ordinance on the regional housing need
for low and moderate-income individuals.
The United States Supreme Court has been a leading proponent
of a local model of zoning. Unlike matters of racial discrimi-
nation, the Court has been unwilling to extend the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to exclusionary
zoning practices when challenged as a matter of economic
discrimination. A major impediment to a regional perspective
of zoning in the federal courts has been that the Supreme Court
has considered suburban land-use regulation to be like any
other police power function. In Village of Belle Terre v.
27Boraas , the Court followed the precedent established in the
Euclid decision. A zoning ordinance excluding households of
more than two unmarried persons from this entirely single-family
municipality could not be demonstrated to lack a rational
relationship to a state objective. In deference to local desires,
the Court stated: "A quiet place where yards are wide, people
few, and motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in
2 8
a land-use project addressed to family needs." Unfortunately,
these objectives approved by the Supreme Court were the ones
that exclusionary suburbs have utilized to defend their land-
use practices.
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Equal Protection and Exclusionary Zoning
The Supreme Court held that housing for low-income groups
was not a fundamental right to be protected by the equal pro-
29tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As a result, a
zoning ordinance prohibiting or severely restricting low and
moderate-income housing would be presumed valid and subject to
a rational relationship test. If low-income housing had been
regarded as a fundamental right, then the Supreme Court would
have employed a "strict scrutiny" test in which the municipality
would have had to demonstrate a "compelling state interest" in
the exclusionary zoning ordinance. This procedural matter of
placing the burden on the suburban municipality to demonstrate
a compelling state interest would almost invariably result in
the invalidation of that ordinance. However, in the federal
courts, suburban zoning practices concerning low-income housing
have been presumed to be valid with the burden to demonstrate
the ordinance has no rational relationship to any legitimate
governmental interest placed on the challenger.
The Supreme Court ruled that economic discrimination was
not a violation of the equal protection clause so long as the
30discrimination was not directed at a racial minority. Poverty
did not constitute a "suspect classification" that required
strict judicial scrutiny of the ordinance. Provided a rational
relationship could be demonstrated, a suburban zoning ordinance
that had an excusionary effect upon housing opportunity for the
low and moderate-income population would be a perfectly valid
39
legislative enactment since discrimination on the basis of
wealth was permissible. On the other hand, exclusionary zoning
challenged as racial discrimination, as opposed to economic
discrimination, placed the burden on the municipality to demon-
strate a compelling state interest. Such a burden placed on
the municipality usually could not be overcome.
The use of local referenda for the authorization of only
public housing projects and also for any change in the zoning
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ordinance was approved by the Supreme Court even though the
purposes were to exclude low-income and multi-family housing.
The Court in both decisions held that the use of the referendum
displayed a devotion to democratic principles. The Court's
conclusion must be regarded as rather tenuous when viewed in
context of this practice of the relatively affluent suburban-
ites being able to decide whether low and moderate-income housing
should be permitted in their municipality to serve the needs of
the less affluent.
The Supreme Court's view of the equal protection clause has
been very supportive of a local model of zoning. A suburban
municipality, without any constitutional violation, would be
able to advance purely local interests by exclusionary zoning
practices and zoning referenda affecting the housing opportunity
for the low and moderate-income population of the metropolitan
region. An American Bar Association report criticized the
Supreme Court's deference toward local land-use decisions:
Lower income groups are not generally
able to make their influence felt in the
political processes of the nation, and thus
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need judicial protection from laws and other
official acts that are targeted directly
against their interests. There can be no
greater justification for upholding a law
that purposefully disadvantages lower income
groups than for upholding a law intentionally
harmful to racial minorities. Government
actions that intentionally impose unequal
burdens on lower income persons, or deny
them significant opportunities made available
to wealthier people, should require some
greater justification in the public interest
than simply that they bear a rational relation-
ship to a legitimate government interest. 33
The Requirement of Intent to Exclude
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
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Authority , the city refused to rezone a tract of land on which
a developer had wanted to build low and moderate-income housing.
The developer alleged the refusal to rezone was racially dis-
criminatory and violated the equal protection clause. The
land in question had been zoned single-family as was most of
the other residential areas. The Court held that a racially
discriminatory intent or purpose must be demonstrated and that
a disproportionate racial impact simply would not be sufficient
grounds to invalidate the zoning ordinance.
The burden of proving that a discriminatory purpose was a
motivating factor in the land-use decision was placed on the
challengers. Such factors as the historical background of
the decision, the specific sequence of events in the refusal to
rezone, and the legislative or administrative history could be
examined to determine if a racially discriminatory purpose was
present. The Court concluded that since the city had planned
the area as single-family residential in advance and that this
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policy favoring single-family residential had been consistently
applied, no racially discriminatory intent could be demonstrated.
The Arlington Heights case did not fully consider the
regional impact of suburban land-use decisions. The ordinance
and the city's refusal to rezone were viewed as being rationally
related to a government interest, i.e. the promotion of single-
family residences. This Chicago suburb's policy of favoring
single-family residence to the detriment of metropolitan housing
opportunities for low and moderate-income minorities was
considered an acceptable objective of the police power. A
suburban municipality could refuse to zone land for low and
moderate -income housing provided the municipality was not
foolish enough to act in a blatantly discriminatory manner that
would provide evidence of intent. If a city could plan its
exclusionary zoning practices in advance before any challenges
were ever made, then any challenge to the zoning practices would
be unable to demonstrate the racially discriminatory intent
even though the discriminatory impact might be quite apparent.
The Supreme Court was quite willing to accept exclusionary
zoning if the suburbs could justify their land-use practices
with a plan in advance of a challenge.
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In United States v. City of Black Jack , a 1974 decision
in which the Arlington Heights test for discriminatory intent
most likely would have been met, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals found a city ordinance to be in violation of Title VIII
of the Civil Rights Act of 196 8, the Federal Fair Housing Act.
Upon learning the Department of Housing and Urban Development
had approved funding for subsidized housing to be built on a
42
site located in an unincorporated area of St. Louis County,
Missouri, residents in this area organized a campaign to
incorporate Black Jack. The proposed site for the housing
project had previously been zoned by the county for multi-
family dwellings. Two months after Black Jack had become
incorporated, a city zoning ordinance prohibiting any new
multi-family dwellings was enacted. The United States alleged
that the city had denied persons housing on the basis of race
and had interfered with the exercise of the right to housing
opportunity.
The Court of Appeals held only a racially discriminatory
effect would have to be demonstrated for a claim under Title
VIII. After examining the effect of the city's ordinance on
housing for the metropolitan region of St. Louis, the court
found that a racially discriminatory impact had been demon-
strated. Thus, the burden shifted to the city to demonstrate
a compelling governmental interest in the zoning ordinance.
The city's justifications for the ordinance—road and traffic
control, prevention of overcrowding in the schools, and the
preservation of property values of adjacent single-family
homes—did not meet the requirements of a compelling government-
al interest because no factual basis for these justifications
was ever established.
The specific sequence of events, a factor cited in Arlington
Heights to be used in determining intent, would have been quite
applicable to Black Jack . The city's sudden incorporation and
adoption of a zoning ordinance would have met the Arlington
Heights test for discriminatory intent under the Fourteenth
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Amendment. As Daniel Mandelker noted, Black Jack was not
particularly helpful in determining permissible zoning practices
because the city had been quite blatant in its racially dis-
37 •
criminatory motive. What suburban zoning practices that do
not violate the equal protection clause but still violate Title
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 is unsettled in the federal
courts.
The Restriction on the Type of Suit
3 8
In Warth v. Seldin , the Supreme Court disapproved the use
of a general practice suit to challenge the overall exclusionary
pattern produced by a suburban zoning ordinance. Among the
challengers who alleged the zoning ordinance had the purpose and
effect of excluding low and moderate-income housing were a non-
profit corporation promoting low and moderate-income housing and
several area residents who were members of minority groups and
also had low or moderate incomes. Only .3% of the land available
for residential use was zoned multi-family compared to 98% of the
land zoned single-family. The plaintiffs had not attempted to
build low or moderate-income housing in this suburb but were
concerned with the suburb's zoning policies in general. In
denying the challengers standing to sue, the Supreme Court stated
that the plaintiffs "...must allege specific concrete facts
demonstrating that the challenged practices harmed him, and
that he personally would benefit in a tangible way from the
39
court's intervention." Since no action had been taken toward
the construction of low or moderate-income housing, the Court
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refused to hear the merits of the case.
The Arlington Heights and Warth decisions demonstrated the
Supreme Court was only willing to review exclusionary zoning
cases in which specific sites were proposed for low and moderate-
income housing, and racial discrimination was allegedly the
reason for excluding that housing. If a racially discriminatory
intent to exclude could be proved, then relief would only be
considered in context of the proposed site for the housing.
The specific-site suit would be dependent upon the desires and
limited resources of a developer who might not wish to put the
time and expense into a specific-site suit. The interests of
the low and moderate-income population in meeting regional
housing needs could not be asserted in suits attacking the
general exclusionary land-use practices in a municipality.
Specific-site relief, in cases of racial discrimination
only, would fail to account for regional housing needs as well
as comprehensive planning on the local level. To provide for
low and moderate-income housing needs on the metropolitan level,
a regional plan allocating the housing among the various local
governments would be necessary. Specific-site relief would only
involve the offending suburb which upon meeting the requirements
of the specific-site relief, could continue its exclusionary
practices until there was another successful challenge to the
municipality's zoning ordiannce. Any of the other suburbs in
the metropolitan area would not be included in the specific-
site suit, even though the same exclusionary practices might
exist. The particular location in a specific-site suit might
not be the most appropriate area within that suburb, but the
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municipality could nevertheless be compelled to approve the
proposed site. The general-practice suit could avoid many of
the problems associated with specific-relief. The general-
practice based upon the exclusionary residential pattern rather
than a specific-site, developer-initiated suit could provide
for sound planning of low and moderate-income housing on the
local level and also a regional plan to allocate housing units
on the metropolitan level.
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In Hills v. Gautreaux , the Supreme Court allowed a
metropolitan remedy in the location of public housing. The
Chicago Housing Authority and the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development were found to be racially discriminatory
in public housing site selection. Regardless of the metropoli-
tan perspective of the housing market area, the Supreme Court
concluded that no element of coercive relief was to be granted
since these Chicago suburbs still should have the power to
reject any proposed public housing. Suburban land-use practices
were affecting the entire metropolitan region, but yet would be
allowed to continue with virtual immunity. There was no obli-
gation on the part of the suburbs to provide low-income housing.
A local perspective of zoning practices and promotion of
strictly local interests were again sanctioned by the Supreme
Court.
In contrast to the Supreme Court's approach to exclusionary
zoning were the state court decisions which recognized economic
discrimination in suburban land-use practices and required that
the suburbs take affirmative steps in providing their fair share
of low and moderate-income housing. Most of the state courts
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have not adopted a regional perspective of zoning and have
generally followed the same standards as the Supreme Court in
determining the validity of a zoning ordinance. The presumption
of legislative validity and the application of the rational
relationship test almost always resulted in too great a burden
for the challenger to overcome.
In its refusal to validate suburban zoning on the basis of
economic discrimination, the Supreme Court has failed to
examine the broader policy implications of suburban land-use
decisions and the interests of a substantial portion of the
population, those qualifying as low and moderate income. The
Supreme Court's perception of exclusionary zoning as a matter
of racial discrimination and then only if discriminatory intent
could be proved was far too limited a definition of this pro-
blem. Race has not been so much the motivating factor in
suburban exclusion as income has. Suburban blacks when compared
to suburban whites have been equally adamant in their opposition
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to low and moderate-income housing in the suburbs. The Supreme
Court by foreclosing for the most part an attack on the exclus-
ionary residential patterns produced by suburban zoning has
abandoned the housing needs of the low and moderate-income
population of the vast majority of states in which their courts
likewise have rejected a regional perspective of zoning.
. . .Continued adherence to Euclidian
zoning principles, with the presumption
of validity applying to "debatable"
ordinances, means that- surface justifi-
cations will continue to prevail and the
underlying problem may never be resolved.
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CONCLUSION
A local model of zoning is predicated upon the protection
of private property interests—a purpose which has often con-
flicted with the regional need for low and moderate-income
housing. The protection of private property interests such as
the single-family residential character of a municipality, the
tax base, and property values has been the essence of zoning
from a local perspective. A local model of zoning would
restrict the inquiry of land-use practices to the municipal
level and the promotion of only local interests. Regional
impact resulting from the operation of local zoning ordinances
would not be a relevant matter to courts proceeding from a local
model of zoning. A local perspective of zoning would reinforce
a purpose commonly attributed to local government—the exclusion
of "undesirables" from a municipality.
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Chapter 3
A REGIONAL MODEL OF ZONING
A regional model of zoning is based upon the premise that
the general welfare supposedly advanced by the land-use practices
of a municipality does not terminate at the boundaries of that
municipality. While some aspects of zoning must be viewed as
only local in impact, those local land-use policies affecting
the development of housing must be recognized as regional in
impact. A suburban municipality must not be allowed to isolate
itself from the other municipalities of the region and, there-
fore, must be responsive to the housing needs of the low and
moderate-income population of the region. Despite the numerous
arguments maintained from a local perspective in favor of ex-
clusionary land-use practices, a suburban municipality must be
placed under an affirmative obligation to provide, by its zoning
practices, its fair share of the regional low and moderate-income
housing needs.
A regional perspective of suburban land-use practices has
differed greatly from the local perspective in the manner of
examining zoning ordinances. Exclusionary zoning, from a
regional perspective, has been viewed largely as a matter of
economic discrimination in which the intent or purpose to
exclude would be irrelevant. The regional impact or effect of
local land-use practices would be the key determinant of whether
a municipality's zoning ordinance was, in fact, exclusionary.
From a regional perspective, the judicial deference traditionally
-50-
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given to local zoning practices has been held inapplicable
unless the municipality has demonstrated that its land-use
practices have not had an exclusionary effect on low and
moderate-income housing and that its fair share of the regional
housing need has been met. The typical justification for
exclusionary zoning practices—inadequacy of services, main-
tenance of the tax base, preservation of community character,
and protection of the environment—have been generally rejected
when the regional impact on the low and moderate-income popula-
tion has been considered.
A regional model of zoning that imposes on the part of a
suburb a fair share obligation to provide the opportunity for a
variety and choice of housing presently exists in only one
state, New Jersey. Pennsylvania has offered a somewhat
modified version of the fair share approach. A few other
states have adopted a regional perspective of zoning practices
without any fair share obligation. The regional approach to
zoning and housing opportunity has generated as many questions
as answers to the problems of exclusionary zoning. Questions
concerning how to define a region, how to determine a fair
share obligation, and what municipalities should have a fair
share obligation have remained areas of controversy in this
field of zoning law.
THE NEW JERSEY APPROACH
In Southern Burlington NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel
,
the New Jersey Supreme Court construed exclusionary zoning as
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a matter of economic discrimination: "... the effect of Mount
Laurel's land use regulation has been to prevent various cate-
gories of persons from living in the township because of the
2limited extent of income and resources." Intent to exclude
was not a necessary element in challenging the township's land
use practices. The challengers were minority group poor who
were living in inferior housing in the township or were forced to
move elsewhere because of a housing shortage, nonresidents
living in substandard housing in the region and who wanted
housing elsewhere in the region and also three interest
groups concerned with housing and civil rights. It was suffi-
cient that the suit be aimed at the general land-use practices
in relation to the housing opportunity. This was a departure
from the generally accepted view that a specific site must be
proposed for lower-income housing before the court would recog-
nize the rights of the challenging parties. Although these
parties were granted standing to sue, the court acknowledged
that exclusionary zoning affected more than just the housing
opportunities for the low-income minorities.
Mount Laurel contained about 14,000 acres and was located
in a growth area between Camden, New Jersey, and Philadelphia.
The township population had doubled from 1960 to 1970. Vacant,
developable land constituted 65% of the township's area.
Approximately 29% of the total land area was zoned industrial,
although only 100 acres were actually put to that use. The
rest of the township, except for a very small amount zoned
retail business, was zoned for single-family detached housing.
Mobile homes and any type of multi-family housing were prohibited
in the township. Over half the total land area had a 20,000
square feet minimum lot size and a 1,100 square feet minimum
floor area. A cluster zoning provision allowed for lots of
10,000 square feet and also required the developer dedicate 15
to 25% of the total area for public facilities. A planned unit
development ordinance which was later repealed provided for
multi-family housing but restricted the number of units with
more than one bedroom. The developer was required to pay the
cost of educating any children in excess of .3 school children
per dwelling unit and also to make contributions for fire
stations, libraries, schools, and community centers.
The court stated that every zoning ordinance must promote
the general welfare, which must be examined from a regional
context in situations where "... regulation does have a
3
substantial external impact." Housing was defined by the
court as a "basic human need," of which the provision was an
4
"... absolute essential in promotion of the general welfare."
When a municipality's land use practices were demonstrated to
have an exclusionary impact on low and moderate-income housing,
the burden was to be shifted upon the municipality to justify
those practices. Contrary to a local perspective of zoning,
the court's approach was to define housing to be a matter of
state constitutional dimension. Those zoning ordinances affect-
ing housing opportunity for the low and moderate-income popula-
tion would not be subject to the presumption of validity and
would have to advance the general welfare of the region, a
concept not to be defined in terms of the municipality's own
interest.
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The court concluded Mount Laurel's zoning ordinance was
contrary to the general welfare and could not be justified by
any reason. The court rejected the "protection of the tax base"
argument as well as an environmental argument based on inadequate
sewage disposal and water supply. Before the court would accept
an environmental argument, the environmental harm would have to
be more substantial than merely inadequate utilities that the
municipality was capable of providing.
The court held the zoning ordinance served to increase the
cost of housing in addition to the prohibition on multi-family
housing and thus permitted only middle- and upper-income housing.
The amount of land zoned industrial was viewed as excessive and
also exclusionary by removing an "unreasonable amount" of land
from any future residential development. The planned unit
development ordinance was also invalid since it was used to
limit the number of children by bedroom restrictions.
The court in invalidating the exclusionary portions of
Mount Laurel's ordinance declared:
. . . the presumptive obligation arises
for each such municipality affirmatively to
plan and provide, by its land use regula-
tions, the reasonable opportunity for an
appropriate variety and choice of housing,
including, of course, low and moderate cost
housing to meet the needs, desires and
resources of all categories of people who
may desire to live within its boundaries.
Negatively, it may not adopt regulations
or policies which thwart or preclude that
opportunity . ->
Mount Laurel was required to amend its zoning ordinance to
allow for multi-family housing, without the cost-generating
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features and bedroom restrictions, small houses on very small
lots, high density housing, and other lower-cost housing. The
obligation to allow low and moderate-income housing was defined
by the court as the "...municipality's fair share of the present
and prospective regional need." The court was unwilling to
specify what factors should be used to delineate a "region"
and upon what criteria a "fair share" allocation must be based.
These responsibilities were given to Mount Laurel. Also the
issue of whether every municipality or just a "developing
municipality" such as Mount Laurel was required to provide its
fair share of the regional housing need was not resolved.
FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN FAIR SHARE
7
In Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison , a
developer and six low-income persons challenged the validity
of the township zoning ordinance. The original suit, instituted
in 1970, resulted in the invalidation of the zoning ordinance,
which the trial court concluded had placed single-family homes
beyond the reach of 90% of the population, allowed only a
minimal amount of multi-family housing, and had failed to
8
consider regional needs. The second suit resulted in the
invalidation of the 197 3 amended ordinance by the trial court,
which ruled the township had not met its fair share of regional
9housing needs. The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled the 1973
ordinance was exclusionary, i.e. whether or not the effect was
intended, it ".. .operate (d) in fact to preclude the opportunity
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to supply any substantial amounts of new housing for low and
moderate income households now and prospectively needed in the
municipality and in the appropriate region of which it forms a
*.
„10part.
Madison Township, with an area of 25,000 acres, of which
40% was vacant, developable land, had experienced rapid
population growth, was located close to highly organized areas
and could generally be described as a "developing municipality."
One- and two-acre minimum lot sizes were required in 80% of the
vacant, developable single-family zones or 58% of all vacant,
developable land in the township. Another 7% of vacant,
developable land was zoned for one-half acre lots; lot size
requirements of 15,000 and 10,000 square feet constituted 5%
of the land. The smallest lot size requirement permitted lots
of 7,500 square feet and two-family dwellings. This zone
amounted to only 2% of the vacant, developable acreage.
Multi-family apartments, which were limited largely to
efficiency and one-bedroom units, constituted 2.3% of the
vacant, developable land. The zoning ordinance also provided
for planned unit developments, accounting for nearly 10% of
the land area. However, the developer was subject to numerous
restrictions. For example, the developer was required to
maintain as undeveloped open space 12.5% of the total project
area and 7.5% as developed open space. The developer was not
only required to dedicate land for a school but also to build
a school to hold .5 child per dwelling unit. Streets and
utility hookups were to be provided by the developer. A
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cluster zoning provision allowed higher densities upon meeting
open space and public purpose space requirements and also
dedicating land to the township. A maximum of 2.4% of the
vacant, developable residential area was zoned for multi-family
housing.
The court found that the zoning ordinance made no effort
to permit "least cost" housing or multi-family housing and also
contained numerous cost-generating provisions. As in Mount
Laurel , an ordinance shown to be exclusionary was presumed to
be contrary to the general welfare. The burden of justifying
the ordinance was shifted to the township which, in the judgment
of the court, had no valid reasons in support of its land-use
practices. The ordinance simply did not meet the township's
obligation as a developing municipality to provide its fair
share of the low and moderate-income housing need for the
region. The fair share concept required zoning for "least
cost" housing, defined as that housing "... consistent with
11
minimum standards of health and safety."
The court acknowledged that no zoning ordinance could pro-
vide for the construction of low and moderate-income housing
but could nevertheless "preclude the opportunity" for this
housing to be constructed. Although developing municipalities
were not obligated to participate in lower income housing
programs, their zoning ordinances must not prohibit or militate
against the construction of "least cost" housing.
Notwithstanding a developing municipality's obligation on
the basis of Mount Laurel to zone in a manner providing for
a variety and choice of housing, the court was reluctant to
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mandate a specific fair share formula to determine the
appropriate region, the housing needs of that region, and the
fair share to be allocated to the municipality. The relation-
ship between a zoning change and the actual housing built was
too indefinite for the court to impose a specific fair-share
formula. There were also too many fair share allocation
formulas to label one as the most correct methodology. There-
fore, the court did not require the township to meet a specific
fair share quota. Rather, the township must "... permit the
opportunity to provide a fair and reasonable share of the
12
region's need for housing for the lower income population."
The court's approach to exclusionary land-use practices
of Madison Township was focused on "... the elimination or
minimization of undue cost-generating requirements" and "...
the inadequacy or non-existence of areas zoned for homes on very
small lots or for multi-family housing." 13 Although fair share
housing plans were not mandatory, these certainly could be
utilized to measure exclusion or to defend zoning ordinances.
Madison Township was required to provide substantial areas for
single-family homes on very small lots, to increase substantially
the area for single-family homes on moderate sized lots, to
enlarge substantially the area for multi-family housing, to
decrease the area zoned for one and two acre lots, to modify
the restrictions which induced the construction of almost
entirely efficiency and one-bedroom units in planned unit
developments and multi-family zones, to eliminate the cost-
generating features in the PUD ordinance, and to eliminate or
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minimize in general the undue cost-generating requirements in the
lower-income housing zones.
The developer was granted specific-site relief provided the
multi-family project was environmentally sound. Invalidation of
the zoning ordinance would have required the township to zone
land for multi-family housing but not necessarily the developer's
land. A common occurrence had been the municipality's failure
to rezone the tract which was the subject of a successful suit
brought by developer and thus a revenge motive could have been
fulfilled. The court noted lower-income housing developers
were relatively scarce, and that the townshp would not be allowed
to prevent this project which would serve regional housing needs.
Municipalities Having a Fair Share Obligation
In Pascack Association, Limited v. Mayor and Council of the
Township of Washington
, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed
the question of whether all municipalities, regardless of the
state or character of development, should have an obligation
to zone for the low and moderate-income housing need for the
region. Washington Township, in which vacant land constituted
only 2.3% of the area, was almost entirely single-family
residential. The court held the fair share obligation imposed
by Mount Laurel was limited to developing municipalities and
reasoned only those municipalities of a sizeable area could
adequately provide for a variety of housing. Developed
municipalities, such as central cities and older suburbs, and
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also rural municipalities not likely to be in the path of urban
growth, were exempted from the fair share obligation. Among
the factors in determining whether a suburb was a developing
municipality were: a sizeable land area, location outside the
central city and older built-up suburbs, the loss of rural
characteristics, great population increases since World War II,
incomplete development, and location in the path of inevitable
future growth.
ANALYSIS OF THE NEW JERSEY APPROACH
The New- Jersey approach offered flexibility in dealing
with exclusionary zoning. It was possible for a developing
municipality to have comprehensive planning on the local level
that still embodied regional housing needs. Urban League of
Greater New Brunswick v. Mayor and Council of the Borough of
Carteret -1- represented one of the best possible judicial approaches
to exclusionary zoning. All the suburban municipalities of a
region, as opposed to the usual single municipality, were joined
in a suit challenging their zoning ordinances. Plaintiffs sought
as a remedy an allocation to each of the 23 municipalities of its
fair share of low and moderate-income housing needs for the
county.
Eleven of the municipalities were required to amend their
zoning ordinances in order to eliminate the exclusionary
features. However, since these eleven municipalities had
minimal vacant land, no fair share requirement was imposed,
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but the ordinances were still required to be reasonable. One
municipality was dismissed because it had provided for its
fair share. The remaining eleven municipalities with large
amounts of vacant land were subject to a fair share obligation.
On the basis of 15% low and 19% moderate income for the county
population, the Supreme Court allocated an equal number of
lower-income housing units to each municipality. Although the
zoning ordinances of each municipality were to be amended to
allow for the allocation of lower-income housing, the court
emphasized that the municipalities could be flexible and utilize
many approaches such as higher densities, density incentives,
diversity of housing type, mobile homes, PUDs, and very small
lots , to provide their fair share of low and moderate-income
housing.
The exemption of the "developed municipality" from a fair
share obligation was condemned as a loophole in eliminating
exclusionary zoning. Justice Pashman in the dissenting opinion
of the Washington Township decision stated that developed
municipalities must also have a role in providing low and
moderate-income housing. The limited application of fair
share to just developing municipalities would allow the
political subdivision of counties into several small townships
to justify the neglect of regional housing needs. Washington
Township contained a small area but combined with the areas of
the other townships in the county, amounted to a substantial,
vacant area. Public facilities such as roads, schools, and
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sewage disposal would be more readily available for multi-family
housing in a developed municipality compared to a developing
municipality with large areas of land unserviced by public
facilities. Land in developed municipalities might still be
available for re-use as multi-family housing. The provision
of lower-income housing could be done less expensively by
utilizing existing public facilities in the already developed
suburbs and also could decrease the amount of urban sprawl and
18
automobile commuting.
The lack of a specific fair share formula by the New Jersey
courts was criticized for failing to provide a reliable test
for measuring exclusionary zoning or for determining a fair
19
share. A fair share allocation process would include three
basic steps: the identification of the relevant region, the
determination of present and future housing needs of the regions,
and the allocation of those needs among the various municipal-
20
lties in the region.
The approach in New Jersey avoided the problems of a
specific-site suit in requiring a municipality to provide its
fair share of the regional housing need. However, if the other
municipalities of the region were not parties to the suit, then
only one municipality out of several municipalities in the
region would be required to eliminate its exclusionary zoning
practices. Unless a suit such as the one in Urban League o f
Greater New Brunswick v. Mayor and Council of the Borough of
Carteret was brought, the possibility of conflicting decisions
in subsequent litigation involving the other municipalities
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would always be present. The essential characteristics of fair
share allocation—that each municipality must provide for its
fair share of regional housing—would be negated when only one
municipality of the region would be required to meet its fair
share obligation. To be effective as well as equitable, a fair
share allocation would have to include minimally all the
developing municipalities of a particular region.
Perhaps an ideal solution to exclusionary zoning from the
court's viewpoint would entail some type of regional mechanism
that would be able to implement a fair share housing alloca-
tion plan. Zoning has been a local function delegated by the
state legislature which has the potential to address this
conflict between regional needs and local interests. The state
legislature could establish statewide regional planning that
could comprehensively and immediately counteract exclusionary
land-use practices and thus obviate the necessity for costly,
time-consuming law suits that would be limited to a few
municipalities. State funding for implementation of regional
housing plans and the state agencies available to administer
such a program would offer advantages over a judicial remedy.
However, the New Jersey legislature has been unable to approach
the issue of exclusionary zoning. When the courts invaded an
area thought to be the domain of the legislature, the usual
criticism that the courts have been acting as super-zoning
bodies and have usurped a legislative function arose. The New
Jersey Supreme Court, in adopting the fair share approach to
exclusionary zoning attempted to remedy a problem that very
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few state legislatures or local governments have ever been
willing to acknowledge.
THE PENNSYLVANIA APPROACH
The Pennsylvania courts have adopted a regional perspective
of housing but have approached the issue of what the appropriate
remedy should be in a different manner than the New Jersey
courts. Pennsylvania courts have invalidated exclusionary
zoning ordinances but affirmative relief has only been conferred
in those suits in which the developer has proposed a housing
project at a specific site. This procedural approach has
precluded a general-practice suit brought by low and moderate-
income persons challenging the exclusionary land-use practices
of a municipality without relating those practices to a particular
housing development.
21
In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. County of Bucks , low
and moderate-income individuals who were unable to find housing
in Bucks County and two corporations wishing to build low and
moderate-income housing challenged the county zoning ordinances
but were denied standing. The individuals had not made applica-
tions or tried to obtain permits for a low and moderate-income
housing development, and the two corporations did not own or
acquire land for such housing. The Commonwealth Court stated
affirmative relief could be granted only in a specific-site
suit and would not be granted to require the county to prepare
a plan for low and moderate-income housing.
22
In National Land and Investment Co. v. Kohn , a developer
who wanted to build single-family housing on one-acre lots
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challenged the zoning ordinance requiring four-acre lots. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared the ordinance unconstitu-
tional and rejected the township's arguments in favor of the
four-acre lot requirement. The township's reasons were to
insure proper sewage disposal, to protect the historic sites,
to preserve the rural character, and to prevent overloading
the already inadequate road system. The court concluded that
the four-acre lot size provision attempted to exclude people
and to avoid future burdens; the general welfare was not promoted
by an exclusionary zoning ordinance.
23
In Appeal of Girsh
, a developer wanted to build luxury
high-rise apartments on land zoned as single-family residential.
Apartments were not expressly provided for in the zoning
ordinance and could only be built by a variance. The court
held that the failure of the township to provide for apartments
in its zoning ordinance was unconstitutional. The effect of the
zoning provision was to exclude those who would live there if
apartments were available. In support of a regional viewpoint
the court stated: "Municipal services must be provided some-
where, and if Nether Township is a logical place for development
to take place, it should not be heard to say that it will not
24bear its rightful part of the burden."
In another developer-initiated suit, Appeal of Kit-Mar
25Builders
, a township refused to rezone a tract from a 2-acre
to 1-acre minimum lot requirement. The court ruled a 2-acre
lot size requirement was unconstitutional due to the exclusionary
purpose or result of the zoning ordinance. Municipalities were
required to cope with population growth and were not "to zone
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out growth at the expense of neighboring communities."
In Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc .,
a developer proposed to build apartments in a single-family
residential zone. The township denied the request for a build-
ing permit even though only 80 acres out of 11,589 acres in the
township were zoned for apartments. The court concluded that
the zoning ordinance was "... exclusionary in that it does not
provide for a fair share of the township acreage for apartment
2 8
construction." The court declared the ordinance unconstitu-
tional and granted specific-site relief to the developer.
In Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Board of the Township of
29Upper Providence , a property owner sued to obtain a building
permit for apartments in a residential district having a one-
acre minimum lot size. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
the township ordinance unconstitutionally excluded multi-family
housing. In a township approximately 25% undeveloped, only 43
acres or 1.14% of the total area was zoned multi-family. Even
with this minimal amount of land for multi-family housing, other
more profitable uses were allowed in the zone and consequently
prevented multi-family housing from ever being constructed. The
court concluded the township had not "...provided a fair share of
30its land for development of multi-family dwellings."
In analyzing the effect of zoning, the extent of the
exclusion—either total or partial—must be considered. If
exclusion of multi-family housing was total, then on the basis
of Girsh , the zoning ordinance would be invalid. When the
exclusion was partial as in the Upper Providence zoning
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ordinance, the court suggested several, not necessarily exclusive,
factors of which a municipality should be cognizant in the
operation of its zoning ordinance. A specific formula for
determining a "fair share" or regional housing need in general
was unnecessary to evaluate the exclusionary impact of the
township's zoning ordinance. The court stated that its review
would be limited "... to determining whether the zoning formulas
fashioned by these entities reflect a balanced and weighted
consideration of the many factors which bear upon local and
31
regional housing needs and development."
Among the factors cited were: whether the municipality
was a logical area for development and population growth,
proximity to a large city, and the projected population of
32the municipality and the region. If the municipality was
demonstrated to be a part of the larger metropolitan growth
pattern, then the development pattern of that municipality would
be examined. The factors included in this step of analysis were
the amount of undeveloped, vacant land, the amount of land zoned
for multi-family housing, and the population density. Thus,
a developing suburb in the path of metropolitan growth must
provide a fair share of land zoned for multi-family housing.
All the factors utilized to determine the exclusionary impact
of a zoning ordinance must be applied to a specific site proposed
for multi-family housing. The overall land-use policies of a
municipality were not required to meet the regional need for
low and moderate-income housing and could only be challenged
in relation to a specific site.
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ANALYSIS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA APPROACH
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, by requiring a specific-
site suit brought by the developer, did not provide an adequate
34
regional framework to analyze local land-use practices.
Reliance upon the specific-site suit would be incapable of
fulfilling regional housing needs for the low and moderate-
income population. The emphasis in exclusionary zoning suits
was placed on the type of housing available in a municipality
without regard to the lower-income housing needs for the region,
The court's definition of exclusionary zoning addressed the
effect of local land-use practices which did not provide for
various types of housing. Consequently, a Pennsylvania
municipality could meet its "fair share" obligation to zone
for multi-family housing by permitting multi-family housing
accessible only to the relatively wealthy. However, a
municipality's zoning ordinance which allowed several types of
housing could still be exclusionary in its failure to meet the
regional housing needs for the low and moderate-income popula-
tion. This possibility was not addressed by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. Although an exclusionary provision of a zoning
ordinance could be invalidated as applied to a developer's
property, any other exclusionary provisions would remain intact,
In a specific-site suit, the overall land-use practices of a
municipality would not be considered nor could the remedy take
into account the effect of those practices on regional housing
needs.
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A developer-initiated suit challenging a zoning ordinance
as exclusionary could result in interests conflicting or in-
compatible with those of persons excluded from a municipality.
The developer's primary interest would be to use the proposed
site of the housing in the most profitable manner. A zoning
amendment allowing multi-family housing or single-family housing
on smaller lots would most likely produce higher profits for the
developer but not necessarily housing for the low and moderate-
income population. The developer's interests would be in seeking
invalidation of the exclusionary zoning affecting his own property
rights and no further. The interests of the low and moderate-
income population for the region would extend beyond the property
interests of the developer. Yet, the rights of those excluded
would be restricted to a specific-site suit, instituted by the
developer. This confusion concerning whose rights were really
at issue in a specific-site suit prompted one land-use attorney
to write:
It raises the issues of racial and
economic discrimination in an oblique fashion.
It requires that th e excluded wait for a
developer not only to propose a project but
also to litigate the prohibition upon his
constructing such a project. It requires
that the rights of the excluded be dependent
upon the fortuity of a claim to be made by a
third party. It ignores the general pervasive
impact of the overall restrictions in an entire
region. 35
The regional approach of the Pennsylvania courts served to
negate the role of comprehensive planning on the local level.
Upon demonstration of the exclusionary effect of a zoning
ordinance, a municipality would be forced to allow construction
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at the site proposed by the developer. Planning criteria that
would enter into the municipality's comprehensive planning
process would not be utilized by the court in granting specific-
site relief. A municipality with an exclusionary zoning
ordinance would be subject to the whims of a developer whose
housing project, regardless of the location, could not be
refused on the basis of a comprehensive plan. Consequently,
housing could be built at unsuitable locations where the
relationship between factors such as the environment, traffic
circulation, access to facilities within the municipality, and
availability of public facilities on one hand and the type of
housing on the other hand would not be contemplated. If a
municipality was required to meet regional housing needs, then
comprehensive planning, in theory, could determine the most
suitable areas for all types of housing within the municipality.
Concerning the specific-site suit, Michael Feiler wrote: "These
piecemeal efforts are not conducive to a planned society nor do
they lend credence to a constructive judicial role in resolving
regional land-use controversies. °
Compared to the Pennsylvania approach, the New Jersey "fair
share" housing approach was much more effective in shaping a
remedy to address all the exclusionary land-use practices of
a municipality. Regional housing needs were construed in terms
of low and moderate-income housing rather than housing type
alone. Under the "fair share" obligation in New Jersey, a
municipality would be able to zone for a variety of housing
so long as the regional need for low and moderate-income housing
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was realized. The interests of the region's low and moderate-
income persons were recognized as the real issue in exclusionary
zoning. There was no confusion on the part of the New Jersey
courts as to the matter of whose rights were at stake.
The general-practice suit in which low and moderate income
individuals challenged the pattern of local land-use policies
established a means for meeting regional housing needs. Each
municipality was to zone for its fair share of the regional
need for low and moderate-income housing. Comprehensive planning
on the local level would be able to determine the most appropriate
areas for a municipality's fair share obligation. Unlike
Pennsylvania, the New Jersey "fair share" requirement provided
a method to insure local land-use practices were meeting regional
needs and at the same time recognized the role of comprehensive
planning in achieving an inclusionary zoning ordinance. The
specific-site suit simply was unable to provide an adequate,
efficient, and equitable remedy to exclusionary zoning.
THE CALIFORNIA APPROACH
The California Supreme Court developed a regional perspec-
tive of zoning in Associated Home Builders of Greater Eastbay
,
Inc. v. City of Livermore . 37 An ordinance must reasonably
relate to the public welfare. However, the court applied a
standard other than the "reasonable relationship" test to those
zoning ordinances that had an impact beyond the municipal
boundaries and affected the interests of nonresidents. The
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court acknowledged the issue of whose general welfare an
ordinance must serve and stated:
But municipalities are not isolated
islands remote from the needs and problems
of the area in which they are located;
thus, an ordinance, superficially reason-
able from the limited viewpoint of the
municipality, may be disclosed as unreason-
able when viewed from a larger perspective. -^8
The court offered the test of "... whether the ordinance
reasonably related to the welfare of those whom it significantly
affects. " j;7 If the ordinance did not have an impact beyond the
city boundaries, then a "reasonable relationship" test would
apply, and the burden would be on the challenger to demonstrate
otherwise. However, if the ordinance had a substantial regional
impact on the supply and distribution of housing, the regional
welfare would have to be examined. The court held that the
traditional practice of judicial deference to the local legis-
lative body was not applicable to an inquiry whether the regional
welfare was being served. Still the burden to show that the
zoning did not reasonably relate to the regional welfare and
had a substantial regional impact was placed on the challenger.
The test for determining whether an ordinance reasonably
relates to the regional welfare involved three steps. The
first step was "... to forecast the probable effect and duration
of the restriction." If inadequacy of public facilities was
the justification for the zoning restriction, then questions
concerning the duration of these restrictions and when the
city would make improvements must be asked. The second step
was "... to identify the competing interests affected by the
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restriction." Such areas of importance as the environment,
adequacy of public facilities, and overpopulation must be balanced
against housing shortages and population pressures. The final
step was "... to determine whether the ordinance, in light of
its probable impacts, represents a reasonable accommodation of
the competing interests.
The regional perspective of the California Supreme Court
must be considered to be at an incipient stage of development.
Whether this approach will be adequate to deal with exclusionary
zoning is unresolved. Further litigation will be necessary to
develop this approach.
THE NEW YORK APPROACH
Property owners sought to have a zoning ordinance declared
unconstitutional because it excluded multi-family housing as a
permitted use in Berenson v. Town of New Castle . The munici-
pality, 35 miles north of New York City and experiencing rapid
population growth, refused to allow any multi-family housing.
Most of the town was zoned for one- and two-acre residential
lots. In reference to exclusionary zoning the New York Court
of Appeals stated: "... the primary goal of a zoning ordinance
must be to provide for the development of a balanced, cohesive
community which will make efficient use of the town's available
44land."
The court held that although no quantitative or "fair
share" requirement should be imposed, the types of housing, the
quantity and quality, and present and future housing needs must
be considered in analyzing a zoning ordinance. This process
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would necessarily take into account regional needs. Unlike the
"fair share" approach, a municipality would not be obligated to
provide for regional housing needs if another municipality in
the region had already built enough multi-family housing to
meet the regional needs . Only when there was an overriding
regional need would the court require a municipality to rezone
for multi-family housing.
The New York Court of Appeals, with no other case law to
elucidate its regional perspective, would apparently allow
regional considerations to be a defense for exclusionary zoning
practices. One municipality could become the dumping ground
for the low and moderate-income housing of the region, and
thus the other municipalities of the region would not be obli-
gated to zone for multi-family or "least cost" housing.
According to David Listokin, "regionalism, then, is a double-
edged sword; it can be used to attack localities having
exclusionary zoning or ignoring regional needs, and at the same
45
time it can justify restrictive local practices."
EXCLUSION AND TIMED GROWTH CONTROLS
Time development ordinances were approved by the courts so
long as they were not used as exclusionary devices. The subur-
ban fear of being overcome by too rapid population growth was
recognized as a legitimate concern of zoning. However, the
problem of uncontrolled growth in a developing suburb would
not be permitted to serve as camouflage for the exclusion of
low and moderate-income housing.
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In Golden v. Planning Board of the Town of Ramapo, a
zoning ordinance established a "phased growth" plan in which
residential development was severely restricted for a period
of 18 years. The plan did provide for low and moderate-income
housing on a large scale. The court stated that Ramapo ' s zoning
ordinance was able "... by the implementation of sequential
development and timed growth, to provide a balanced, cohesive
47
community dedicated to the efficient utilization of land."
The court issued the caveat that only those "timed development
ordinances providing for low and moderate-income housing would
be approved.
In Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County v .
48City of Petaluma , the city had adopted a 5-year plan which
fixed the housing development rate at not more than 500 dwelling
units per year. Housing permits were to be evenly divided
between single-family and multi-family units, and 8 to 12%
of the housing units were to be low and moderate-income. The
court concluded the plan did not have an exclusionary effect
against a particular income group or racial minority.
HOW SUBURBS MAY AVOID COURT INTERVENTION
Suburban municipalities throughout most of the states have
been permitted to ignore regional housing needs and conduct land-
use practices from an entirely local perspective. On the other
hand, some suburbs have not wished to take the risk of litigation
concerning their land-use practices and, therefore, have
participated in regional planning bodies and adopted fair share
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housing allocation plans. This, of course, has not meant that
an exclusionary suburb would change its land-use practices
merely by adopting a fair share plan. Particularly in the
states where the courts have adopted a regional perspective
of housing, a suburb's participation in a fair share allocation
plan would be a prudent strategy whether or not the plan was
ever intended to be implemented. The plan could always have
utility as a defense of a zoning ordinance alleged to be
exclusionary.
A fair share housing allocation plan would involve three
basic steps: (1) identification of the appropriate region;
(2) determination of present and future housing needs of the
region; (3) allocation of these housing needs among the various
49
municipalities of the region. Although the methodology in
this process may range from the simple to the highly complex,
no single fair share formula has emerged as superior to the
rest. The unsettled methodology has left the courts in a
precarious position in formulating remedies to exclusionary
zoning. The New Jersey Supreme Court was well aware of the
uncertainty in fair share formulas and, therefore, refused to
require a suburb to use a specific one.
A region could be delineated by a locality, county, multi-
county area, SMSA, or housing market area. For a very large
metropolitan area, subregions might be necessary. One of the
more popular methods of identifying the region has been the
housing market area analysis which has utilized the journey-to-
work as a principle factor. * In this method, employment
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opportunity, transportation availability, and housing location
would be used to determine the geographical area or region in
which all the housing units would be in competition with each
other. Regardless of the method of identifying the region,
exclusionary suburbs will attempt to limit the area of the
region, i.e. omit the housing needs of the central city in
order to minimize the regional fair share obligation of each
municipality.
To project the regional housing need for low and moderate-
income housing, definitions of low-income and moderate-income
must be established. The amount of substandard or over-crowded
housing, future income levels, income levels necessary for newly
constructed housing, and housing turnover would be among the
factors to be considered.
Fair share housing allocation could be executed on the
basis of equal share, need, distribution, or suitability.
These criteria would be, by no means, independent of one
another and could be combined to provide a fair share formula.
The equal share criterion, the easiest to incorporate in
a formula but perhaps too simplistic, would establish the same
quota of low and moderate-income housing units for all munici-
palities. The biggest drawback would be its inflexibility to
account for the suitability of a municipality and equitable
matters such as the concentration of lower-income people or the
relative wealth of a municipality.
Need as a criterion for housing allocation would offer a
greater degree of flexibility. However, this criterion, alone,
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would result in the concentration of low and moderate-income
housing in the central city due to its greater number of lower-
income people and inferior housing units. If this factor of
need included future population trends and employment oppor-
tunities, then the suburbs would not be able to avoid their
"fair share" of low and moderate-income housing.
A fair share allocation based on distribution would attempt
to promote greater economic integration of the metropolitan
region. Those municipalities with relatively high incomes
and low minority population would receive the largest allocations
of low and moderate-income housing units. This approach
undoubtedly would be the most unacceptable to the suburbs.
Suitability would be a criterion that could significantly
promote comprehensive planning. Among the areas examined in
order to ascertain the suitability of a municipality for low
and moderate-income housing would be availability of land,
environmental impact, adequacy of municipal facilities and
services, employment opportunities, and fiscal impact. A land
survey would determine the location and amount of vacant,
developable land, the location of undeveloped areas relative
to each other and the developed areas, and environmentally
sensitive areas. Public facilities and services would be
analyzed to determine present and future adequacy for low and
moderate-income housing. Employment opportunities would include
future commercial and industrial development and would demonstrate
if a municipality was a suitable location on the basis of future
employment trends. An analysis of the fiscal impact would
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project future municipal revenues and expenditures and the effect
upon these resulting from low and moderate-income housing
development.
Many exclusionary suburbs will try to use arguments based
on suitability to delay, to reduce, or to avoid housing
allocation quotas. Of course, inadequate municipal facilities
and services and also adverse fiscal impact were rejected as
excuses for failing to meet regional housing needs in New
52Jersey and Pennsylvania. In New Jersey, developing munici-
palities would have a fair share obligation simply on the basis
of the amount of vacant, developable land with no other factors
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except the environment in very extreme cases
.
Several regional planning bodies have adopted fair share
plans on their own initiative free of judicial involvement.
However, implementation has often been lacking. One problem
has been the availability of funds for housing subsidies. More
importantly, the function of the regional housing plans might
not actually be to allocate housing units to suburban municipal-
ities but instead to appease potential challengers of exclusion-
ary land-use practices and to comply with the requirements of
54the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Until there
is judicial intervention, the fair share housing plan might be
for the most part nothing more significant than pieces of paper.
JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO FAIR SHARE HOUSING PLANS
On the basis of the state court decisions adopting a
regional perspective of zoning, it would be quite questionable
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that the state courts would ever become directly involved in
what has been termed "statistical warfare" and require the
suburbs to use a specific fair share formula. Certainly,
suburban municipalities have the option of devising a fair
share formula and may transform their low and moderate-income
housing quotas into specific provisions of their zoning
ordinances. The courts have not been so concerned with the
actual number of low and moderate-income housing units allocated
to suburbs as they have been in the effect of suburban zoning
ordinances. Simply stated, a zoning ordinance must not isolate
a municipality from the rest of the region by neglecting
regional housing needs.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court developed a much less
intricate concept of fair share than the New Jersey Supreme
Court. A zoning ordinance, without regard to low and moderate-
income housing needs for the region, must provide for a variety
of housing types. A zoning ordinance requiring lots greater
than one acre might be unconstitutional depending on the
particular circumstances and the effect of the zoning ordinance.
The total prohibition of multi-family housing in a municipality
would be invalid as an exclusionary zoning practice. A suburban
municipality within the sphere of metropolitan growth would have
to provide for a fair share of its land for multi-family housing.
This fair share obligation would be similar to a "reasonableness"
requirement in that the amount of vacant developable land, the
amount of land zoned for multi-family housing, and the popula-
tion density would be examined.
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The New Jersey Supreme Court offered the most extensive
guidelines in what a "fair share" of the regional housing
need encompasses. The fair share obligation applied only to
a developing municipality, one of sizeable undeveloped land
area in the path of urban growth. A developing municipality
must, through its land-use regulation, provide for a variety
and choice of housing that necessarily included the regional
need for low and moderate-income housing. Conversely, a
developing municipality must not preclude the opportunity for
"least-cost" housing to be constructed.
In order to comply with the fair share obligation in New
Jersey, a developing municipality should consider the present
and future housing needs for the municipality, present and
future housing needs for the region, and what constitutes the
appropriate region. Although a fair share formula was not
mandatory, a zoning ordinance would have to provide for present
and future housing needs of not only the municipality but also
the region. Those zoning provisions which would increase the
cost of housing or prohibit multi-family housing would be in-
validated due to the exclusionary effect. A municipality would
have to zone substantial areas for single-family homes on very
small lots and moderate-sized lots and also multi-family
housing. A zoning ordinance must not discourage the construc-
tion of multi-family housing with two bedrooms or more. A
zoning ordinance must not contain undue cost-generating pro-
visions that would preclude the opportunity for least-cost
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housing. A municipality should determine what types of least-
cost housing could be constructed.
CONCLUSION
The state court decisions embracing a regional perspective
of housing must be viewed as significant advances in the
evolution of zoning law. While some decisions might be too
limited or even inadequate to deal with such a complex issue as
exclusionary zoning, the judicial activism sanctioned in New
Jersey might be too much to expect from other courts in an area
of immense political controversy. The general welfare,
supposedly advanced by all zoning ordinances, has been recognized
as regional in nature. The regional perspective of zoning has
questioned the assumption that the protection of private property
interests and other local concerns would be a legitimate objec-
tive of zoning. The protection of private property rights has
been viewed as conflicting with the general welfare, when
regional housing needs have been frustrated. A regional model
of zoning would recognize the right of low and moderate-income
persons to housing opportunity in the suburbs and that the
general welfare would require that this right be incorporated
into suburban zoning ordinances.
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Chapter 4
FAIR SHARE AND BEYOND
The Case for Judicial Involvement in Meeting Regional Housing Needs
In 1968 the National Commission on Urban Problems, commonly
known as the Douglas Commission, perceived the problem of suburban
exclusionary land-use practices and recommended reorganization of
local land-use decision-making in order to disperse low and
moderate-income housing within the metropolitan area. Housing
opportunities for low and moderate-income groups were to be ex-
panded by mandatory local planning which was to be in accordance
with a regional housing plan. This proposal was dependent upon
state governments enacting legislation that would require region-
al or state review of local land-use policies. The American Law
Institute's Model Land Development Code contained many of the
recommendations in the Douglas Commission Report.
However, most of the state legislatures have chosen not to
follow the recommendations of the Douglas Commission Report.
Although there have been a few well-intended, but inadequate
attempts by state legislatures, no state legislation has even
approached the problem of exclusionary zoning in a manner
advocated by that Commission. Of course, there have been
numerous programs of federal and state involvement requiring
a regional approach in activities other than lower-income
housing, e.g. environmental protection, transportation, health
care, and education. But the issue of dispersing low and
moderate-income housing in the suburbs has remained politically
untenable in the state legislatures.
-86-
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In 1969 Massachusetts enacted the Zoning Appeals Law that
allowed developers of subsidized housing to appeal to a Housing
Appeals Committee upon a municipality's prohibition of such
development or policy of severely restricting this type of
2housing. Although this legislation contained numerous loopholes
for suburbs to avoid regional housing needs for the lower-income
population, this regional concern was at least being assessed by
a review agency. The class of challenger to public agencies,
limited dividend sponsors, and non-profit organizations which
would not necessarily be inclined to engage in a long and costly
appeals process. Another problem in Massachusetts has been that
no affirmative duty would be placed upon a municipality to zone
for lower-income housing. Rather, the issue of exclusion would
be raised when a developer of a specific project initiated a
suit according to his own interests.
In 1968 New York established the Urban Development
Corporation which was to have the authority to override local
zoning ordinances in its housing developments. The UDC had
planned to disperse low and moderate-income housing in several
suburbs which vehemently opposed this strategy. This suburban
recalcitrance to the UDC ' s plans prompted the revocation of the
override power by the state legislature in 1973. The New York
experience plainly demonstrated the highly political nature of
dispersing lower-income housing in the suburbs and offered
convincing support for the position that only the courts have
the capacity to deal with this issue of suburban exclusion.
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Numerous regional planning bodies whose membership included
the area suburbs have quite admirably examined regional housing
needs and produced regional housing plans. The Miami Valley
Regional Planning Commission for the Dayton, Ohio metropolitan
area was the first to adopt a regional housing allocation plan.
Although subsidized housing was dispersed in the suburbs of
Dayton, nearly all the units were moderate-income and served
suburban needs. Therefore, the objective of dispersal of
3
central-city poor in the suburbs simply was not attained. The
nature of exclusionary zoning dictates that the voluntary
participation by the suburbs in these regional housing plans
be viewed with skepticism. Since participation by suburbs in
regional planning places no affirmative duty upon them to do
anything at all, the effectiveness of these arrangements must
be questioned.
For a fair share strategy meeting regional housing needs
to be implemented, there must be definitive guidelines for
suburban zoning ordinances. The results in New York and
Massachusetts indicate that the state legislatures are largely
ineffectual in their attempts to address regional housing needs
for the low and moderate income. The regional planning
commissions lack mandatory standards in allocating housing units
to suburbs whose participation does not make the fair share
quota binding in any sense. A few of the state courts have
shown that guidelines can be judicially developed in exclusion-
ary zoning litigation. In light of the importance of regional
housing needs, a recent ABA report concluded that the state
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courts were quite capable of handling regional housing remedies
4in exclusionary zoning suits.
TOWARDS A COMPARATIVE MODEL OF ZONING
The state court decisions have indicated a trend that
judicial scrutiny of suburban land-use practices will perhaps
rely more on a balancing test than on any complicated fair
share formula. Courts so far have avoided the prescription
of specific fair share methodologies although specific criteria
have been provided to guide in the formulation of local land-
use policies. For any judicial test in land-use regulation,
the effect of suburban zoning ordinances will be examined in
relation to the regional housing needs.
The emphasis on the effect of local zoning practices will
allow more options on the part of a suburb in transforming its
zoning ordinance to reflect regional interests. Consequently,
the role of planning will be enhanced by the use of a balancing
test, since the definition of region and regional housing needs,
and the fair share methodology will have to be determined by
comprehensive planning on the local level. State courts will
probably refuse to act as a super-zoning body and will avoid
involvement in the actual planning process by utilizing a
balancing test, which primarily examines the effect of land-
use policies.
Criteria for a Balancing Test
When state courts have been able to determine the effect
of a zoning ordinance to be exclusionary, the traditional
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presumption of validity has been reversed and the burden has
been placed on the suburban municipality to justify those
zoning practices affecting regional housing opportunity. For
example, when timed growth controls have been implemented by
a suburb, this restrictive growth policy has been held per-
missible provided the ordinance has allowed substantial areas
for low and moderate-income housing. Likewise, environmental
protection may justify the excusion of low and moderate-income
housing from certain sensitive areas within a municipality but
never the entire municipality. Zoning purposes which are
routinely accepted as legitimate in most of the state courts
will not be permitted to justify restrictions or prohibitions
on low and moderate-income housing meeting the metropolitan
needs
.
Not all municipalities will be required to zone for their
fair share of lower-income housing. Those suburban municipal-
ities with substantial areas of vacant, developable land in the
path of urban development will have to be aware of the fair share
obligation. The older, almost-completely-developed suburbs will
be able to escape the affirmative duty to include regional
housing needs in their zoning ordinances. Of course, there will
be numerous law suits determining just which suburbs do have to
provide for regional housing needs. This most likely will
require a case-by-case analysis on the types of suburbs that
will have this affirmative duty.
The fair share obligation of suburbs has brought about a
modification in the traditional concept of property rights.
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A few of the state courts have been quite willing to consider the
rights of parties other than the property owners. The right of
access to suburban housing opportunities for low and moderate-
income persons of the region is being recognized as a require-
ment of the general welfare presumed to be advanced in all
zoning ordinances. This expanding concept of the general
welfare in land-use regulation is not limited to the protection
of only lower-income, racial minorities but also includes the
general economic category of low and moderate-income persons.
However, a suburban municipality must only provide by its zoning
ordinance for its fair share of the regional housing need. After
that objective has been attained by a suburb, then prohibitions
or restrictions may once again be placed on low and moderate-
income housing.
Comprehensive Planning and Regional Needs
The role of comprehensive planning as a policy guide for
suburban governments in their land-use controls is being increas-
ingly emphasized by the state courts. Local governments most
probably will continue to be responsible for land-use regulation
provided that regional housing needs are not being frustrated.
State courts will scrutinize a suburban community's comprehen-
sive plan and its relationship to its land-use controls and
lower-income housing opportunities. Comprehensive planning
will be required to support and promote inclusionary zoning
practices in regard to low and moderate-income housing.
A fair share standard for metropolitan housing needs may
be determined by several methodologies which depend largely upon
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what allocation criteria are to be stressed. The planning
process enters at this stage by providing a methodology in
defining the region, regional need, and appropriate areas for
low and moderate-income housing development. Comprehensive
planning by local units of government would then be able to
encompass local interests in determining the most appropriate
locations within the municipality but without neglecting
regional housing concerns.
The fair share obligation is a standard that state courts
can administer since they limit their examination to the impact
of zoning practices on low and moderate-income housing. No
absolute numbers of low and moderate-income housing units will
be required to be allocated to suburban municipalities. While
comprehensive planning by a suburban government will not be
allowed to ignore regional housing needs, comprehensive planning
potentially offers a great amount of flexibility for a suburb in
meeting its fair share of regional housing needs. A mix of
housing types, densities, and lot sizes as well as incentives
to build low and moderate-income housing could be incorporated
into a land-use scheme that promotes regional responsibility.
A Duty of Regional Responsibility
Suburbs with substantial amounts of vacant, developable
land will be required to include these guiding principles in
their land-use decision making:
a. the present and future housing needs for the low and
moderate-income population of the region have been analyzed.
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b. the zoning ordinance has established areas for a
variety of housing types without cost-generating provisions
beyond the minimum standards for health and safety.
c. the zoning ordinance does not place unnecessary
restrictions on multi-family housing and mobile homes.
d. the zoning ordinance provides for single-family homes
with small floor areas and on small lots.
e. the zoning ordinance has allocated reasonable amounts
of land to meet future regional housing needs and has not over-
zoned for non-residential uses in order to prevent housing
developments
.
f. In general, those land-use policies or procedures having
the effect of excluding low and moderate-income housing have
been eliminated.
THE SOCIETAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE FAIR SHARE APPROACH
The Spatial Distribution Approach to Urban Problems
A popular viewpoint has been that the elimination of
resistance to low and moderate-income housing development in
the suburbs and the resultant dispersal of the lower-income
population from the central city would provide a solution to
what is loosely referred to as the "urban crisis." The problems
of housing, segregation, unemployment, poverty, municipal finance,
transportation, education, and other services are certainly
symptomatic of the "urban crisis." If this "urban crisis" is
defined as a matter of poor spatial distribution of physical
design, then perhaps the fair share housing approach of opening
the suburbs to the lower-income population would be an appropriate
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remedy. However, the fundamental question is whether the
spatial distribution of the metropolitan population should be
examined as a dependent or independent variable. Regional
planning literature seems to express that spatial distribution
is an independent variable, that is at the root of many urban
7
problems. The spatial distribution of housing is therefore
viewed as the problem rather than just a characteristic of a
larger systemic problem.
The proponents of fair share housing do acknowledge the
stratification within a metropolitan area, the unequal fiscal
resources available to local units of government, and the
generally disparate quality of environment between the inner-
city and suburb. Equal opportunity in housing is thought to
be the panacea of many of these urban ills. The economic
integration of the low and moderate-income population into
the suburbs would be the primary goal of the movement to open
8
up the suburbs. Suburban housing opportunities for the low
and moderate-income, it has been argued, would allow for the
dispersal of central-city problems throughout the metropolitan
region and thus alleviate the "urban crisis," whatever the term
9
entails
.
It has been reasoned the fair share housing approach would
allow low and moderate-income housing to be constructed where
the job opportunities are the greatest. Potential workers have
simply not been allowed to reside near the places of employment
in the suburbs. The result has been labor shortages in the
suburbs, particularly in the lower paying jobs, and a labor
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surplus in the central cities. The reliance upon the car and
the lack of adequate public transportation to the suburbs have
done little for the inner-city poor who may desire employment
in suburbia. Without housing in the suburbs, the journey-to-work
for the lower-income residents of central cities has been costly,
time-consuming, and difficult.
It has also been contended the concentration of poverty and
other social disorders in the central cities could be reduced by
12
lower-income housing development in the suburbs. A fair share
approach would prevent the creation of suburban slums since a
suburb need only meet its quota of lower-income units and then
no more. Dispersal of the low and moderate-income population
in the suburbs has been proposed as a means of both relieving
the financial burden of central-city services and also providing
13
more equitable levels of services in the central cities. Many
hold the view that until the number of poor in the central-cities
has been reduced, no solution to the urban crisis can be expected.
From a fair share housing approach, the problem in metropoli-
tan America is the spatial distribution of the low and moderate-
income population. In context of its development in zoning law,
this approach has viewed the metropolis in physical terms and
has set forth a physical solution just as the approach of the
zoning pioneers of the early 1900 's also did. Obviously, many
of the same urban problems exist as they also did when land-use
controls were first proposed, and the physical design approach
to urban problems is still being promulgated in the fair share
housing strategy. In addition, the fair share concept, as a
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physical solution, has not really proposed any change in the
existing political or economic structure.
The strategy of opening the suburbs to the low and
moderate-income population would represent basically a "blocked-
opportunity" approach to urban problems. The lower-income
population largely confined to the central cities has been
viewed as the people left out of the mainstream of American
14
life. The exclusion of this group from the suburbs has
supposedly denied them the opportunity for economic advancement.
This group is believed to have values and aspirations of the
mainstream population, but they lack the economic opportunities
available to the rest of the population.
Although the institutions are assumed to be essentially
sound under a "blocked-opportunity" approach, maladjustments
within that structure of institutions do occur such as the poor
spatial distribution of the lower-income population. Presumably,
the lower-income population can be made more functional within
the existing institutional framework by eliminating the exclu-
sionary development practices of the suburbs. Implicit in the
fair share approach is a definition, of poverty in individual-
istic terms: if only the lower-income people could be given
equal opportunities to reside in suburbia, they, too, could be
successes.
The goal of economic integration or equality of housing
opportunity in the suburbs does not necessarily mean the
achievement of equality of results. Many writers have questioned
the concept of assimilation into the mainstream of American life
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IS ...in the suburbs. Although the opposition in the suburbs to low
and moderate-income housing is well documented, the lower-income
population has also expressed serious reservations concerning
the fair share housing approach. The fair share housing
approach has been perceived by the poor and in particular the
black as a more sophisticated version of their removal from
16
the inner city. The political power base o f the inner-city
poor may also feel threatened. The central-city governments
may not wish to lose the federal funds for subsidized housing,
that would instead be allocated to suburban governments. Many
of the inner-city poor have taken exception to this notion of
participation in the mainstream of life in the suburbs.
Neighborhood control by the poor in the inner cities has been
advocated by some as an alternative to dispersal of the lower-
income in the suburbs.
An Urban Stratification Approach
An alternative method of analyzing the metropolis would
concentrate on the distribution of power rather than the
spatial attributes of the metropolitan population. In essence,
this approach would focus on urban stratification and would
attempt to examine whose interests are being served by
suburbanization. The fragmented metropolitan governments
would be viewed as a means of reinforcing the unequal distribu-
tion of economic, social, and political resources in respect to
location within a metropolitan area. Richard C. Hill wrote
about the nature of exclusionary suburbs:
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Intergroup conflict in the metropolis
resides •in an attempt of group members to
gain access to or control over, those insti-
tutions which govern the distribution of
symbolic and material advantages. The social
relations among classes and among status
groups, imbedded in the means of economic
production and exchange in the metropolis,
structure differential access to income and
economic goods and services. The unequal
distribution of income and social status
among groups fosters an unequal system of
social relationships in the urban housing
market and local government institutions
resulting in differential individual access
to housing, neighborhood and "municipal
life style." 18
Urban stratification approaches have not perceived the
spatial segregation of the lower-income population as a causal
factor in urban problems . The suburbs have been able to force
the less affluent to finance central-city services, to exclude
those high-cost residents who require more services, to attract
the relatively affluent, and in general to isolate the wealthy
from the poor. Suburban land-use controls have played an
integral part in this process, which cannot be defined simply
in terms of locational differentiation. Under an urban
stratification approach, the suburb has been recognized as a
part of the social stratification system in its role of per-
petuating inequality within a metropolitan area.
If the fair share housing approach is examined from a
perspective of urban stratification, then perhaps dispersal of
the low and moderate-income population would diminish any
political or economic power generated by those people in the
central cities and would be adverse to their interests. Once
the lower-income population would be dispersed equally through-
out the suburbs, the distinct possibility would exist that they
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would be in an even worse position. Whereas in the central
cities, the lower-income population would at least have some
political clout based solely on their number and their poten-
tial disruptive force. It perhaps would be better for the
lower-income population to be concentrated in the central
cities than to be still poor but scattered among the suburbs.
At least in the central cities, the poor remain potentially a
force to contend with and thus cannot be ignored.
Inequality must be viewed as the real issue in the spatial
differentiation of metropolitan areas. Nowhere in the fair
share approach is the vast inequality of wealth in the United
States or the functioning of the institutional structure ever
questioned. The strategy of opening the suburbs to the lower-
income population constitutes nothing more than altering the
spatial patterns of the metropolitan region and leaves the
institutional structure intact. At the most, the fair share
housing approach may result in more cooperation of suburban
governments in providing areas for lower-income housing.
Whether this approach would alter patterns of social and economic
inequality is quite dubious.
METROPOLITAN SOLUTIONS
Metropolitan solutions have become quite fasionable in
the field of urban studies. Where urban renewal, the Community
Action Program, and Model Cities left off, the metropolitan
planning approach has moved into the vanguard to save the
19
cities. Certainly, there is appeal in what is arguably the
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rather simplistic approach of metropolitan planning to urban
problems. With its emphasis on the spatial distribution of the
population, this approach does not dispute the institutional
structure. A typical metropolitan planning approach described
the "urban crisis" in this manner:
The causes of these problems are not
found only with residents of the so-called
problem areas , nor are all of the problems
located solely within the jurisdictional
boundaries of the cities. It is unreason-
able, therefore, to look only in the cities
for their solutions. Rather, we must enlist
the resources of the entire metropolitan area
in solving problems that exist within that area. °
The question must be posed as to what the above description
really meant. Undoubtedly, the political fragmentation and
spatial differentiation of metropolitan regions were perceived
as the ultimate cause of many urban problems that would have to
be examined on the metropolitan level. Government intervention
at the metropolitan level would be a solution based on this
description of the "urban crisis." One group of authors labeled
this approach to urban problems as hardly a novel one:
The term "metropolitan problem" has
often been affixed to any situation requir-
ing cooperation or interaction between adja-
cent units of government in urban areas.
Problems are usually identified on a service
basis, and there is hardly any governmental
activity which has not been identified as
constituting a metropolitan problem. 21
The Future of Fair Share
The fair share approach as delineated by the state courts
has been directed at the physical development of the metropolis
and has been consequently limited to a physical solution, the
spatial redistribution of the population within a metropolitan
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region. When placed within the framework of zoning litigation,
any other possible solution than a physical one would be beyond
the scope of the courts. The courts are only able to remedy the
problem of suburban exclusion in relation to local zoning
ordinances. The socio-economic factors responsible for urban
spatial differentiation are beyond the ambit of zoning law.
At least three factors make the fair share approach a
desirable course to pursue. The population pressures of the
metropolitan area, the availability of land in the central
cities, and the cost of reconstruction in the central cities
necessitate the fair share housing approach. However, those
advocating the fair share housing approach as the panacea to
urban ills in general have at minimum been guilty of oversell.
There are sufficient grounds to doubt the strategy of opening
the suburbs as a solution to central-city poverty and other
problems that can be analyzed in terms of institutional
structure.
For an organization such as the Suburban Action Institute
to expend the amount of resources in zoning litigation with the
hope of eventually solving the "urban crisis," this may be an
erroneous path. The spatial distribution is just one manifesta-
tion of the uneven development of American cities. When a
strategy to solve the "urban crisis" does not even challenge
the unequal distribution of goods , services, and income in the
United States, then it must be asked from whose viewpoint does
opening the suburbs seem to make sense. Any solution to
suburban exclusion based almost entirely on the regulation of
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the physical development of metropolitan areas is far too
limited in perspective. The strategy of opening the suburbs
has embraced an ideological element in that this approach
signifies the preservation of the status quo when scrutinized
from a viewpoint of the impact oh the institutional framework.
Before the fair share housing approach can be recognized
for its worth in metropolitan planning, proponents of this
strategy must acknowledge that inequality will remain relatively
untouched by suburban housing development for the lower-income.
At the same time, the problem of where the lower-income popula-
tion will reside within a metropolitan area may be addressed by
the fair share housing approach. An inclusionary zoning require-
ment for low and moderate-income housing in the suburbs at least
forces the allocation of areas for this housing. This is a
significant departure from traditional zoning practices that
have promoted exclusion.
Urban planners must strive to keep the ideological element
often used to support fair share housing separate from the
pragmatic element. It would be simply inconceivable for low
and moderate-income housing needs to be met entirely within
the central cities. That remains the substantive problem.
However, the fair share housing strategy degenerates into an
ideological device when it is adorned with "equality of
opportunity" and is hailed as the solution to the "urban crisis."
This "inequality of opportunity" ideology must be severed from
the fair share housing stragety as a planning technique:
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The phrase, "equality of results," or
"full equality," suggests several ideas that
have not been widely accepted by the American
experience. Traditionally, we have been
satisfied to choose "equality of opportunity"
as a goal, and to assume that it is right and
just that vast inequalities of income be allowed
to result as long as the race is fairly run
from an even start. Of course, we have never
been able to achieve the fair and even start
imagined by those who talk about equal
opportunity . 2
2
Planners must re-examine planning paradigms and the
assumptions upon which they are based. The limitations of a
spatial distribution approach to urban problems are apparent
in the lack of institutional analysis. The strategy of opening
the suburbs to the lower-income population likewise does not
question the American socio-economic structure. Such an approach
wrapped in "equality of opportunity" may be attacked as an
ideology justifying the status quo and deflecting criticism
from the institutions. Before the "urban crisis" can be solved,
the issues of why social inequality exists, and more importantly,
whom does it serve, must be addressed. The fair share housing
approach, as a planning technique, is incapable of answering
those issues. Planners must always be aware of that inherent
limitation.
Perhaps the ultimate conflict confronting planners was
expressed when David Harvey wrote:
Part of the planner's task is to spot
both present and future dangers and to head
off, if possible an incipient "crisis of
the built environment." In fact the whole
tradition of planning is progressive in the
sense that the planner's commitment to the
ideology of social harmony—unless it is
perverted or corrupted in some way—always
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puts the planner in the role of "righter
of wrongs," "corrector of imbalances" and
"defender of the public interest." The
limits to this progressive stance are
clearly set, however, by the fact that the
definitions of the public interest, of im-
balance and of inequality are set according
to the requirements for the reproduction of
the social order which is, whether we like
the term or not, a distinctively capitalistic
social order. ^3
CONCLUSION
Although the fair share concept imposes an affirmative
obligation on suburbs to provide in their zoning for low and
moderate-income housing, the basic conflict between local
responsibility and regional needs still exists, despite the
state court decisions attempting to resolve that issue. It
must be conceded that the fair share approach as developed by
the courts in New Jersey and Pennsylvania has yet to become
truly operational. Without a system of regional government,
the zoning power will still remain under local control.
Implementation of fair share housing perhaps will result only
from a succession of protracted legal battles in which the
suburbs will attempt all possible ways to delay their affirmative
duty. Nevertheless, the courts have had no other alternative than
to adopt this regional approach to exclusionary zoning since the
other branches of government have refused to act.
The courts have always tended to examine zoning in relation
to the rights of property owners. Under a regional approach to
zoning, some state courts, however, have attempted to examine
zoning from a perspective of the rights of the low and moderate-
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income population of a metropolitan area. These state courts
have demonstrated their ability to analyze local land-use
controls and to identify exclusionary zoning practices. But
the remedies have lagged behind. Perhaps, the fair share
approach in promoting the goal of equal housing opportunity
in the suburbs comes too close to the politically-sensitive
issues of inequality in American society. However, the fair
share approach as adopted by the state courts has provided
guiding principles in suburban land-use practices and must be
acknowledged as a significant development having a major impact
on metropolitan planning.
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The relationship between local land-use policies and
regional housing needs is examined in several court decisions.
Zoning as it presently functions in the nation's suburbs has
had an impact affecting the entire metropolitan development.
A local of model zoning—adhered to by the U.S. Supreme Court
and most of the state courts—has been supportive of the
exclusionary land-use practices in many of the suburbs.
Protection of private property interests has been the essence
of zoning—a purpose which has had the effect of excluding the
low and moderate-income population from many developing suburbs.
Under a local model of zoning, a municipality has no duty to
provide for regional housing needs.
A few state court decisions, most notably in New Jersey,
have adopted a regional model of zoning which imposes a fair
share requirement on developing suburbs to provide for regional
housing needs. A regional model of zoning has rejected the
traditional presumption of legislative validity generally
given to suburban zoning ordinances having an economically-
discriminatory effect. Decisions of the various state courts
are compared and analyzed to extract guiding principles in
suburban zoning practices which must incorporate regional
housing needs.
A comparative model of zoning that incorporates regional
responsibility is synthesized from the relevant case law, and
the future implications of the fair share housing approach are
examined. The general welfare, which is to be advanced in
zoning as a police power function, will be viewed as a regional,
rather than local, concept. State courts utilizing a regional
approach to zoning most likely will apply a balancing test rather
than statistical formulas. The effect of local zoning ordinances
will be the key factor in identifying exclusionary zoning
practices. A balancing test, with its emphasis on effect, will
allow more options on the part of a suburb in transforming its
zoning ordinance to reflect regional interests. The role of
planning will also be enhanced in implementing regional housing
plans. Due to the extremely controversial nature of fair share
housing, the state courts will continue their supervision of
local land-use policies in the suburbs which will be required,
at least, to meet a minimum quota for low and moderate-income
housing units.

